Thank you to any and thank you to all of
you for being here and nothing is more

endearing to a person who's been
born in India than to find monsoon.

So I think it's perfectly fine and
then we have rain it's I like

the pleasant to rain and the sound of rain
and the been falling and especially when

it's warmer than the New England rain
which is over is a little shocking.

So thank you for being here.

I'd like to thank Danny thanks so much for
inviting me down here into the sand and

school in Georgia Tech you know for
having me down here and and especially.

Angie for dealing with the logistics
with a keen sense of humor there

which is wonderful and
Michael also for setting this all up.

And I'm glad you like
the cover of the book.

We went through a little bit of
a negotiation the book is on negotiations

and there's a bit of a go see action and I
wanted Hermes on the cover of the book and

that sculptures of Hermes Cambridge did
not find suitable for the audience.

Some of them come from the third and
the fourth century A.D.

And I just thought well I'm sure the
GENEVER are diplomats can take a sculpture

of Hermes from that time.

But apparently couldn't so
we did find this is the foot of Hermes and

it was designed by a nineteen year old.

Graphic designer from San Francisco and
they got the rights for it and

I've come back to the figure service
in a while when you live in Washington

people's eyes glaze over when
you start talking about I.R.

isms and and start describing to them
what you're working on I think people's

eyes glaze glaze over every time I could I
would begin to talk about their research.

So I had to come up with a hook and
my hope was

that what people thought determines
outcomes in international relations.

Is it power or is it talk.

And I just thought of that
distance to the public or

to people if they were to say that and
actually to my surprise most people did

get engaged in my research once
I said that and I would say.

If I would take a block sample.

Forty percent would say power forty
percent would say talk in Geneva.

There would be a seventy percent
talk to any percent power.

Depending on where you are and then that
in betweens but that's really in a way

what this book is about trying to explain
international interactions in the world.

We're calling the high tech driven
global information economy and

trying to see what really determines
it at a very broad level and

this is something I return to at the end
the book is about global governance and

what I positive is then as much we we
still have evolving institutions of global

governance and we're still trying to come
to grapple with the global governance

process these they pay is it behooves us
to pay attention to what those governments

produce these are and
I posit negotiations as a way of

governance not as an outcome of governance
not as an input into governance but

as governance itself because they
are forms of conflict resolution they're

forms of cord a nation of
collaboration of cooperation.

So that's really where I go with this
book after starting with power talk

to try to talk about how and negotiations
are to form rough global governance.

Let me start with a couple of brief
anecdotes drawn from my case studies and

then what I'll do is spell out my
conceptual framework really briefly

I will probably just sort of run through
give you a sort of very broad picture of

my case studies and then return to
sort of the broader lessons here and

then it just prompt me because
we're all academics we love to talk

about this document you
wanted to end half an hour.

OK I'd like to get your feedback.

I know a few a few so and
as much as I continue to work on

this it after you finish writing
the book the next one suggests itself.

So I continue to work on these issues.

Really appreciate the the feedback here
let me start with the story that is sort

of the umbrella case study here
that frames my my argument.

And that's the Global Services
the kind of the services or

the intangibles the telecoms the finance
hotel banking tourism tourism by the way

is the largest service industry and our
airlines and that's I stocked a book with

the story of services which is something
that the United States wanted as part of

global trade talks even before the Europe
where round of trade talks from what is

now known as the World Trade Organization
at that time to get even before your

ground started a decade prior to that U.S.
service industries had said this is where

our comparative advantages and we would
like this on the next trade rounds agenda.

The talk you're on by that time had
already begun but services were not on

the agenda and because of the push from
the growth of U.S. service industries and

what were to become the Coalition for
service industries in the United States.

It still exists.

And that U.S. began to argue that we
should be putting services on the agenda.

The Europeans were sort of not doing luke
warm to the idea they in fact said this

doesn't look like today it's not a shirt
you can put in the box and open it on

the other side we're tired of surround it
with this doesn't look to us like trade it

in fact said this looks to us like
an investment issue which in a way it is.

But there was a lot of opposition to it
by the developing world was very Him and

to be opposed to this in the seventy's and
eighty's is when the developing world

begins to start thinking about playing
a role in global trade talks and

at that time the issues of interest to
them are quite obviously agriculture and

and some forms of manufacturing and
services is too high tech for

them and and
they think that hair your pursuit trying

to dominate this organization
the debates that we've had in the U.N.

General Assembly and
UNCTAD in other places as come to get.

Offices by then when they think we're
being excluded you're again proposing

an item that we are completely opposed to.

And we now know that the so-called
Euro go round of trade talks with.

Starts in one thousand nine hundred
six got stalled for a number of years

especially four years when they would
begin it in one thousand nine hundred two.

So the Seattle off the euro ground for

was the one thousand nine hundred
two ministerial in Geneva.

When that part they could stop it but

got stuck over the services
issues support for years.

There was a lot of problem solving
that took place within gat and

eventually it does make it on the agenda
with the developing world opposed to

it around Europe ground is launched and.

The understanding is that
the services would be separate but

equal between different
tracks of negotiations and

that was an assurance to the developing
country that should things not materialise

in services they would still have
signed agreements in agriculture and

manufacturing that's nine hundred
eighty six in September in winter.

The last a year of where the line.

Ground gets lunchtimes
you've been there and

I finally understood why they
want to point to the last.

It's the middle of winter so
the hotels are empty.

I said to her and I suppose to have
a global trade round but in September.

It's winter and everything I went
there in September of last year and

from there I can see all this
trade officials moving around but

by nineteen eighty nine
countries like India and

Brazil which were opposed to services
have come around a full circle.

They begin to see it in their interest
that they may have something to get from

services and not because their domestic
interests industries within the developing

world are saying here it's in our
interest for you to sound services but

because of what's going on within the get
within the euro go down processes.

There's a significant amount of learning
that takes place and by ninety nine Brazil

and India are ready to sign on to
the services agreement as it's shaping up.

Now get into the details of this later and
actually the Coalition for

service industries begins to move away in
one thousand nine hundred come out and

denounce this agreement to say
this is US has given up too much.

This is not in our interest and

it was a sort of perform over
because they wanted more so.

Denouncing it in international for it was
good but hey you have a significant change

in interest from where they were in one
thousand nine hundred two earlier to

by the time the euro go round of trade
talks and in modification one thousand

nine hundred four the developing
world has come around a full circle.

Here's something where we would have
thought that not only would interest

knocked change but that the developing
world would be coursed into an agreement

in fact to the point that to this day many
academics and other nationalists continue

to face assert I would say in their
research that the developing world

signed away their fortunes in services to
get something in other areas and that's

clearly not the case if you really look at
the history of that around look at the so

the negotiation history of the issues in
developing world played a big role in many

of these trade talks which was actually
key to them signing it and they began to

see that they might gain from this
they began to realize that what the so

called tertiary sectors.

Actually what the services sector is that
there was a lot in it for them and even by

the very conservative estimates from W T O
the services trade is about two point five

trillion dollars It's only a concert about
one quarter of the trade total trade but

it's because we don't have estimates for
intangible services like we do for good.

So we dilly don't have good
estimates of tourism or

trying to consume something which hasn't
been put into a box and sent over.

So the developing world buys into this and
the agreement at the end

looks very different from what
it looked in the beginning.

The second case that I want to relate to.

Now come back to sort of broader lesson
from this is the European Union's

data privacy initiative.

OK In the mid one nine hundred ninety S.
the directive that comes out of

the European Union which says there's
a particular guidelines to be followed for

any forms to transfer data
from one form to another or

from one organization to another this
doesn't sit very well with the US

data privacy guidelines where it's
mostly sort of in private hands.

Now here you have government
authorities because most

of the European Union countries have
data privacy directorates which come out

of the one nine hundred sixty S. and.

And there's a dispute which eventually
would lead to threatening at that time in

the late ninety's to over one hundred
billion dollars worth of trade in

the growing industry of electronic
commerce becomes a very big

part of the biggest trade disputes in
the late one nine hundred ninety S.

and the two countries are actually larger
not two countries the two regions one

would say are at loggerheads with each
other but eventually through the problem

solving within the negotiations comes out
an agreement that is called Safe Harbor.

It remains problematic to this day but

on the other hand it's something that gets
discovered during the negotiations and

now you can see where I
am going with this story.

What I assert in this book is that we're
not with the negotiations who will be able

to explain these outcomes.

Because I our theory in
its sort of grandest level

would have thought in the first case
that the weak acquiesce at some level

and if it was about other theories they
might have thought that if the weak

don't acquiesce they might be able to play
off the great powers against each other or

somewhere along the way it was
in their interest to do so

if you look at the domestic factors but
that's clearly not the case and

in services what's actually happening
is a form of learning that takes place

during the negotiations in the second
place what you have is symmetric

power distribution so you would think
they would remain deadlocked and

not be dissolved at all unless
again domestic interests are others

able to influence them on this and there
were some interest in the trans national

coalition of industries which put pressure
on the Europeans as well as the U.S.

but what the safe harbor agreement was
something that came out of the agreement.

And I talked to the negotiators
of the European side and

this is the kind of described as a cook a
dance with the Americans just kept saying

you know we have enough safeguards I
don't know why you worry so much and

the Europeans keep saying no you don't
even have a data protectorate authority

and I are mags and
I was leading the talks and

at some point along the way I imagine
there happened to say and David Aaron

of those who were involved in this and
said well we mean by self regulation.

The U.S. is that if the companies don't
abide by a standard then the F.T.C. can

step in and the Europeans said well that's
not what we understand by self regulation.

And for them it was likely that the
government never steps in this it can you

write that down and they actually is in
Bend it was one of the negotiated gave me

the letter where they asked the Americans
to write that down in a letter that's

what they meant by self regulation
because then they could take that over to

the European Parliament and others and
say there is a provision there but it's

something is this sort of problem solving
that happened during the negotiations.

So in some ways to me I have
the margins that we have about

particular types of power distributions
in particular types of outcomes.

They're often international
relations to me are suggestive

they might say they might predicate
a particular set of outcomes but

they don't quite tell you where and
how and

negotiations make a difference and
the way in which interest might change.

So here's kind of the broader
model that I have

in most of our marvelous we have
societal pressures of power

structures which give us a sense of in
this particular case a national interest.

But that's for the purposes of this book
that we may even have societal interests

of trans national interest and
then we have outcomes and

what I'm arguing here for
some reason this out of office products

from Europe is that you
get national interest or

through the negotiation process those
interests might change themselves and

that this is sort of people say that the
particular outcomes in other words to me

the power structure of the domestic
interests are a necessary condition but

the sufficient condition is then
suggested by the negotiation process.

Let me sort of I'm going back should
live tell you where I'm trying to make

a contribution here.

We've had a group of scholars talk about
negotiations with a group of scholars top

obviously about power structures etc and
then the never the twain shall meet.

So we will.

Continued to have if you're a power
structure type person we've continued to

say Well diplomacy that
makes a difference.

We don't provide a model of diplomacy then
we have a group of negotiation scholars

who say here's how negotiations
make a difference but

then point quite come back and connect
it with the structure to saying what

ways was that negotiation constrained or
not constrained.

So the big claim that I'm making in
this is not that negotiations make all

the difference or that we're back
in the world of the cities but

to try to specify the conditions under
which negotiations process is unlikely to

make a difference and that understanding
then I take is by starting with that

antecedent necessary condition by
speaking off not a power structure but

a power configuration here I'm obviously
paying homage to people like Susan strange

and others who talk about configuration
rather than structures and

what I argue is that if you
are starting from a point where

there is a difference to
power in the world economy.

And one of her books and other treat
of the states was in strangers'.

Subtitle is the diffusion of power and
that's where I'm getting that term if

there's diffused power in the world
economy that allows more wiggle room to

the actors to shape particular
types of agreements and

I would actually argue that that's what
began to happen in the services case on

the other hand if there is
a concentration of power.

Are concentrated power then
the strong determine the outcomes for

the week now hard to I in negotiation
terms unpack these power configurations.

Here's how I do so.

I am looking forward to mention
these are configurations.

One is number of issues that
are included are being talked

about if there are multiple
issues then you have at the some

basic level you may be able to practice
tactics like trade offs or linkages and

that's what we believe actually happened.

The services case that that the developing
world traded off services to get

some kinds of outcomes in agriculture or

Texas where if this is a singular issue or
an issue that gets framed as something.

Singular national
identity our security and

nobody is allowed to unpack that
singularity then you're going to have

people biting heads in
terms of number of actors.

If there are multiple actors were
suspended by laughter like this for

United States likes bilateral negotiations
because that is us against Colombia.

Even though we made our sign
that agreement at all because

they are just abusing their human rights
and other practices down in Colombia is

the president Congress is alleging but
on the other hand that the U.S.

can walk into a Colombia
are pirouette are now with their.

Investment treaties in places like Europe
where acceptance is signed here sign their

sign here.

You're not allowed to amend anything in a
multiple when there are multiple actors in

a multilateral negotiation are the great
power doesn't have those privileges

because it allows for actors to
form coalitions are practiced other

tactics which are not available where
they are in a bilateral context.

I also look at a number of domestic
coalitions in a context in

which you have one portion at home which
says you have to bring this agreement or

else and there is no other opposing
coalition this is actually what happened

with the intellectual property
agreement that I examined

as part of the global services of
the global information economy.

There was a monolithic coalition of the
United States which was able to get actors

to sign on from the European Union and are
that ten to Europe the European community

and Japan etc and
if there was no sort of opposition to it.

It was a north versus south issue.

And so

with the result that the negotiators
hands were tied from the north they

had to bring that home now that coalition
has factored but back then it hadn't.

In fact it became more and

more monolithic as time went along
with the intellectual property issue.

If you have multiple coalitions
then your own negotiator herself or

himself has more room to maneuver.

There are three constituencies
at home at the most of them.

The least.
Rather you could trade off particulars

are try to come up with a median voter or

something like that which
delivers a particular package.

So that's the number of
domestic coalitions and

then I look at market power domestic
phone screen best because I'm

examining international
economic relations here.

And again if you have a monopoly
at home then the negotiators

hands are going to be more tied than if
you have a competitive marketplace and

you find that in cases where the United
States has dominant market power for

example one of the cases I look at
is the telecom pricing dispute and

in telecom pricing us tried to negotiate
with the rest of the world and

they didn't come around and
it was actually a multilateral forum and

eventually you have to see past
a benchmark order and said here

after this particular day we will not
abide by this and could get away with it.

Because it's got the dominant market
advantage in that particular case.

So to return to sort of
the antecedent condition.

Instead of just looking at power as
a structure I look at as a configuration

which also means that the power
configuration could change along the way.

Right and that for

example one of the disputes say examine is
the creative or the cultural industries

dispute it started off as something
which was very multilateral and

then it became US versus rest of the world
kind of issue along the way that it

became more of us of a concentrated
us versus them type of game for

the great powers in order to get what they
want even though that agreement may not be

legitimate in sort of
the Enlightenment sense but

in order to get what they want
us versus them game is better.

Because then they have fewer alternatives.

Especially for them because
that's the power configuration.

Where do I do with
the negotiation tactics then

what I'm suggesting is that
negotiation outcomes will.

Which are suggested by power diffusion or

diffusion of power will
probably lead to outcomes

where all parties get something versus
when there is a concentration of power

in which the great powers
tend to dictate the outcomes.

Let me take you through
the eight big cases.

That I examined in this book I went
against my very best advice to all of my

students to only pick one case to narrow
down to these cases some sure I can do

eight cases and then so that this took ten
years and I would never do this if you did

it because each of these cases has a
massive episodic community attached to it

and so if I have a major there in
the kids it's completely my fault and

as I someone is not actually just
a narrow down the skeptic oriented.

It is worthwhile in hindsight but
here are the cases that services.

What you.

Had was the width of
the negotiation process got set up

the developing world got
included in the process.

After that agreement it went
to the last step to start.

For leap economy or
who has them back to different Colombia

headed these negotiations with
the group on the go station services.

They had about twenty six twenty
eight sessions and when they met

one of the mandates for them was OK
we're going to negotiate services but

we don't know what it looks like.

How should we design measures for
trade liberalisation and services.

What should we look at all of
the Americans in the Europe or

the sector who are very forthcoming
with what it should look like but

there was a genuine problem solving
that took place during the negotiations.

So with the result by the one
nine hundred eighty nine.

For example developing Ward Porton certain
types of provisions which would benefit

one of the major ones was that they wanted
a positive list approach what that means

and in the general agreement of terror
trade and services that I am only going to

negotiate those actors in order
to protect this board so hurt it.

Pressure of course to their product
as only one would ever want

recently is a truism except for

of course the Reka So
that was a big coup for

the developing world because
Americans want to the negatives.

Everything is up for grabs.

Unless you take away from it.

So in other words unless your
ministry says someone says

I'm going to have the following provisions
where I will take away from the room and

it's all in their bodies and so
in getting a positive list approach for

service industries obviously did not like
that because that meant that then they'd

have to look at the schedules of each and
every country to see what they

committed themselves to it was
a gradual list approach but

it was very legitimate in the sense of
the entire world buying into it and

saying this is actually in conformity
with that interest and we can see how our

tourism sector our software industry or
something else might gain from it so

that diffusion was suggested by
the kind of negotiation processes and

the kind of coalition building that went
along and specific mini issue areas so

Services wasn't just taken as
one issue to have at the end

when that woman which was tailored to and
seemed to benefit all.

In the intellectual property negotiations
which actually started at the very same

time as your ground started and
that was the other issue which is holding

it up in the developing world and
pay attention to this type

of the American industries once something
going to come to feed goods and they kept

thinking was going to be about come to fit
into the full force of the intellectual

property agenda hit them in one thousand
nine hundred seven by which time

the intellectual property coalition which
included anywhere from thirteen to fifteen

major multinational firms had already
cemented their agenda together put forth.

Lots of studies and lots of measures in
terms of this is what we want in terms

of the agreement and
by the time it arrived on the table.

It was a yes or no thing.

So it was it started off with
something which developing what type

was a diffusion of power they
would have a say in that but.

By the time it reaches the negotiation
table there lies the there to let in fact

now the intellectual property negotiators
from the developing world have woken

up to this and started following the U.S.
domestic agenda very carefully and I found

the trips negotiator from India because
India was one of the major holdouts say

if we had paid a debt our attention to it
in the early one nine hundred eighty S.

to how the intellectual property coalition
was shaping up in the United States would

have been better off and even then some
of the measures that developing countries

were able to get were as a result of
them having studied the U.S. law.

So one of the places where I take on

my wonderful colleagues was in sevens
actually did not blur appearances and

I part company on this is
that the developing world did

not spend negotiators who
didn't understand this issue

a lot of times it's argued the developing
world didn't know what was going on.

Nobody knew what was going on India's
Kipps negotiators now the associate

director of the the intellectual property
secretary within the within the W.T.

She went to school at G.W.
India's intellectual property

team Brazilian intellectual
property team later on.

Now the South African
intellectual property and

they're very well
educated in these issues.

So we should stop this part about they
just don't know what's going on in Geneva

and therefore they lose no it was
because they didn't realise how

the agenda had shaped up they may not
have paid much attention beyond the U.S.

laws to what was happening in
terms of U.S. domestic politics.

So those are sort of my two three cases
because a lot of the other cases in

the south part of the intellectual
property agreement but

again you have very opposite outcomes both
start with diffusion of power in one you

get I will loose agreement and then the
other when you get a win win the one and

then I go through the other cases to show
how depending on the particular types

of power configuration particular types
of negotiation process these come about

which then leads to our weird way
where the laws are in one particular

case I sort of no agreement because the
book took so long to write that allowed.

Where my one case became two or
three cases so

hard as you might be interested as
I started working when I can and

by the time I would finish what I
can the recess era had arrived.

All right so
in the Internet governance case

you really had a kind of the United States
really understood this and

had proposed something to the Europeans
but there was this feeling on the part of

the Clinton administration that to
really make the Europeans go along.

They should just make concessions.

Even if the Europeans don't want to.

And so the framework for electronic
commerce and the kind of civil society

organizing in the United States
led to multiple coalitions and

and some feeling on the part of the U.S.
government that even though it's

the agenda setter it should make
concessions but I can't promise that

to be is when the rest of the world awaits
us the intellectual property you should

begins to wake up and how much power the
U.S. really has on this in the beginning

in the around one thousand nine hundred
two thousand really all part that I kind

of case was delivered to us some form of
democratic international governance and

then without good market comes into
being you know that even the dispute

settlement is that what
Intellectual Property Organization.

I kind is effectively a U.S. corporation
with a lot of power from the U.S.

Department of Commerce and so
what are some before it's actually

society that we're supposed to see
is that they're trying to force.

Yes but it's becoming a case again of
us versus them at some level because so

far with the dead I was very
unwieldy along the way in the book

I was to speak of what type of pretend the
setting what type of court action really

what type of information tactic is most
likely to deliver particular kinds of

advantages to that actors are involved
in the negotiation process and

in the Whiskas what you find is that
it's not sort of singular agenda.

It's just an unwieldy agenda and
that's hard

in terms of shaping global norms at some
level it might have some influence but

in terms of getting the go see
it in our Comes in their favor.

It may.
Not at work I can return to these cases

in our discussion but for now I want to
return to some of the broader lessons that

fall out of this book.

The first one is about our
understanding of power.

Most of our models of power are predicated
around our version offered instrumental

power in the power of the phone X.'s
ability to get one or it's about up from

a structure of power is going to take a
sudden variant of instrumental power X.'s

ability to constrain why in
particular kinds of circumstances and

that happens a lot in a number
of these negotiations but

I'm also interested in what I call and

how we develop these concepts since about
two thousand and two job growth and

I didn't know that book called Information
Technologies and global politics we were

trying to come to an understanding of the
sort of transformation of aspects of power

especially in interactive environments
information technology type environments

are interactive environments
like negotiations.

What happens when people's interests begin
to change and where the issue that they

thought it was something is not the issue
that that really you get the agreement

on so in order for us to say we've got
a really weird electric property you would

tend to think that everybody understood it
was a directory property in ninety four.

Actually they didn't tell us counterfeit
goods or in services case you have

a scenario where you might think you know
the developing world was completely of

course going to demand a post but actually
no they just changed along the way.

So the concept that I've been working
on is what I call a better power it's

antecedent to me to instrument a power
structure power because it defines

the dimensions the understanding of
the issues defines the X. and Y..

So before we say that's going to do Y.
or X. can put a strain

why we have to know what is X.
and what is why and what is the issue.

What is the constituted
understanding of this issue.

You can see here.

Our base from which to
construct this is this.

Instance but
our work hard to develop such a quality

productive power part company with
them too because to them that

happens in the margins this sort of this
all the resistance to a particular agenda

is always happening in the margins and
to me this is happening in the mainstream.

So in that sense of calling it back to
power as a sort of a transformative

transformative power.

I think I want to develop that concept for

those of you have any suggestions
of critical questions.

I hope you'll come back to me with that
the second major lesson from this for

me is about global governance and
here I've tried to build on what I have

actually was a very eclectic understanding
of global governance that put forth in

this presidential address he parks company
with his own ilk and talks about sort

of a very broad understanding of global
governance in terms of accountability and

participation persuasion to come back he
said most of the international governance

processes don't meet those standards and
so I took up his key part

credit here to see to what extent do we
meet the growth of government standards.

It's actually negotiations.

First of all and participation of people
like him are people like high people lead

others who talked about the elite realm of
diplomatic negotiations tend to think that

it happened outside off
the public sphere that this

is not a place where you ever have
civil society demands very magnetic or

free private We've all
seen pictures of Oxfam and

others protesting outside of W T O and the
international organizations which gives

lend some some power to that belief
that that would never approximate

the conditions of the public sphere public
sphere being where general problem solving

takes place if all interests get
represented at some level what I find

here is that there is a genuine problem
solving taking place in the Go see action.

If it happens when there is
a fusion of power in other words.

Most of them are of
negotiations which are perfect.

It got this kind of horse trading.

And where the greater able to horse look
we need to take into account the kind of

situations where you have
genuine problem solving.

That's what happened in the safe harbor
to go see if that's what happened in

the service is a negotiation that there
was a genuine dialogue that came about

where and in the end we need sort of this
ethnographies at some level of these type

of negotiations to understand how is it
that India began to trust the services

negotiated from the U.S. side within
services negotiation where they were

screaming at each other would interact or
property in the GO SEE A should do it.

So there were two Indias and two United
States there and in this one particular

room there was an approximation
in terms of the participation and

accountability part of the public sphere
because they were these core initiatives

which come about which are able to
influence at some level to Barry extent

their chief negotiators for their neighbor
to deliver are not delivered an agreement

Indian service industry resilient service
industries etcetera began to wake up US

came around in the services and

it goes in fact they formed a mid-level
cord which really services.

So the cafe au lait coalition is
actually broke out of the hardliners.

Because it included the Colombians and the
Swiss who came together and said we need

a mid-level Polish and I also find that
mid-level of the MARGARET COURT It's

only come about when there's a diffusion
of power because if you're a great power.

You don't want to wait it out of Cornish
because they may have countries defect.

We find that for example even in
security negotiations by C.B.L.

the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines you have

the part of a process was led by
a mid-level coalition and so on and

usually when you have a mid-level
coalition and the process that develops

along the way his part in the gym it in
the sense soft or ready acceptance rather

than of a barrier and sense of legitimacy
versus do obedience you're told to sign.

So you sign it and.

And so in terms of the.

Three out of Kohei accountability
comes from those chains of delegation

that the negotiators have been not just
representing themselves there is a clear

understanding in Geneva and other places
that you are representing particular types

of interest and you find that there's
varying levels of interest representation.

If you're the U.S.
negotiator and then your hands

are far more tired than if you are and
I would go and say that the Indian

negotiator because our content of domestic
consultations that needed to really figure

out what you're interested are not there
in a way that's maybe why there is so

much learning in the services negotiation
because they just can't believe

that somebody understand this is not in
our interest at the beginning to learn

the way back to the service industries
that this might be addressed to now

we live in the year two thousand and
nine when India is a services powerhouse.

Now you compare that with the debates
in one thousand nine hundred two when

India was saying services the worst thing
that could ever happen to a global trade.

And then in terms of not just a couple of
accountability in terms of participation

by major players here is let's
start off and go see actions.

Normally in the sort of prisoner's
dilemma horsetrading sense.

Most part of our of that's why I
don't use game theory and game theory

provides us with strategic encounters
where actors know their interests and

they are that are going to
skew towards each other.

Are they locked in separate cells or

they're trying to figure out whether to
go to the opera or the football game but

the male member knows he wants to go to
our credit can remember now is that she

wants to go to the football game
they know that it exists and

they're not going to
change it in the end but

coordination is just a product how
much operating how much football or

whether we should have a game of chicken
or whether we should get out of prison or

not what I'm suggesting is it's nice to
teach because there are pockets in global

governance especially in the context
of diffusion of power where people may

not know the interests of the interests
of interchangeable in that way and.

And they come up with solutions
which are clearly way

in a different sense than
game theory suggests to us.

Now we can dream our game theory to
speak of changing preferences and

people are beginning to beginning to
do that but the next challenge for it.

I would pose to get it was to
come up with problem solving and

not just a teacher can come to use and
finally in terms of persuasion.

Here's where people are having a ball and
others say.

You cannot have any kind of persuasion
happening in the diplomatic elite around

people like Henry Fowler another star most
recently and they continue to say that but

what you find here is the persuasion lies
in those negotiations tactics of our host

often the go see action tactics
that I go through in my

framework where this sort
of the discussion I can I

go through the various types of tactics
in the way that they get practiced and

persuasive are not to speak
are the circumstances under which this

persuasion comes about and in many
ways I'm going back to the lynchpin

are the origins of negotiations
in places like France or

their career in seventeen sixteen when he
writes but on the matter of negotiating

with princes and because the air is
telling us that we should think about

Europe as a republic of states where the
blunder of the smallest sovereign can cost

an apple of discord in the rats and
he has that his mind a kind of an interest

subjective understanding of diplomacy
that he knows he's trying to shape.

He's trying to shape the French diplomatic
card his understanding of what it

is that they do and why is it that they do
it and that's sort of the intersubjective

understanding of diplomatic negotiations
that I'm coming to in terms of talking

about how that X. and the Y. must not just
be understood in an instrumental sense but

also in the intersubjective sense
where actors when they meet in Geneva

know who they are why is it that
they're playing the diplomatic game and

they're not just this lonely prisoners
who have this information decide.

Vantage incarcerating them and therefore
we get us about the most solution to

the normative lesson that I take away from
this book not normative in a moral sense

but normative and so they kind of mystic
sense in terms of best practices and then

as much as negotiations take place in a
diffusion of power we can then go wrong in

terms of global governance in negotiating
the global information economy.

Likely to take power but
has been invested in

organizing higher education.

It's high risk you want to run
very quickly but very quickly.

OK So this is I might say
How are you did you actually

head in the ghost issue theory
where we said that when Bill.

For example said
the strong horse the weak.

We are saying your right.

So there goes that and

there were boys under the contract and the
best alternative to a negotiated agreement

if I'm a weak power than my best
alternative doing of course you

are negotiated agreement is worse
cannot say no to the United States.

So the party.

Here's some alternatives but once you
have presented diffusion of power.

You see how you're going to be
greater than a concentration of power

then you can practice the strategies and
tactics which way worse or

better your alternatives and
then the reman that comes about is

a win win lose lose lose no
agreement the kind of four options.

So you have power configuration or

structure those purposes the particular
outcomes as a result you

are in your moment of understanding why

yes it's in that X. and the Y.
as I pointed out here.

Might change.

Because of this you know the first part
of this is the second part of this

right here next might change

as a result that I'm here to look at
our nation like Jagers other sources.

For example intellectual property to go
see what started off as a fusion of power

but as a collector property
coalition of the United States

sort of closed its ranks and they got
the kid running just about over Eunice and

Brussels to go along with it was about ten

different type of power structure not that
would be I guess if one was to model it

and in point to that does it
represent about simultaneous

equation martyr board I'm suggesting
here is the root of all of this and

to see something that never
changes along the way but change.

So now that all your stuff
will probably right.

This is very interesting talk I think it
kind of gets a terrible scene in the US

your own drug X. Y.
axes are evolving or evolve at the right

price because as you're seeing if
you're coming with a nationally or

probably just different
paradigm All right.

One is basically a positivistic

will come our players and
potentially their interests.

Take place.

You said you decide not to
use your rational choice.

Right.
But clearly with

all your Mary posts right now it's up in
the closet but moving away from us but

it's clearly the first quarter top
it was like OK it looks like eight.

You've got a whole tight
statement actors and

there's a few actors from the Troy
set limited kind of if you look

right statistics friends tell you just
how many politicians there are right.

Just a few.

The stuff was created.

There's a whole lot of different
combinations to take place

in which case there's a number of
stable states that get a bird.

There are really make a difference right.

So there's a concentrated starting point.

Possible outcomes not wish to
go right to STARTING POINT.

Multiple collaborations negotiations make
it difficult to tell people what right.

That's a kind of positive right.

But it turns out that.

We're not really go over steal from.

Presumably people kind of know
pretty clearly that all those

people still are going to go see
things that people don't even know or

really do a sleep which I never
experienced I can wear for five years.

We fought over things elite frankly
none of us really understood exactly

right there is a huge simultaneously
good future and a learning process.

Well that's exactly.

And there's a phrase services.

We're fighting over it but

we don't know whether they're very
intellectual property rights.

We don't mean it was turned
out we did them so that.

So the second paradigm constructivist
like intersubjectivity

you can use the term merger phenomenon.

But I find that a hurdle useful.

It's up as a concept.

On your radar you know Sandra Bailey
wrote a letter right now.

That certainly that is you think
you know your part there but

I think the other line about what things
are going to go over is a softer version.

So you're it turns out what you
thought was a tree trunk or a road.

You know you never tell
your Stargirl by rebel.

But you do it here.

Now what's interesting is to take your

framework to use versus concentrated
which makes a lot of sense of right.

First of all right.

What does that say about social
construction that's right and

I think this is potentially
kind of novel and

where you from your religious terrain is
a structural model of constructivism.

So.

So suddenly in your house
if there's a real what

goes on your study of Nazis of
intersubjective social partnership.

How are processes of social partnership
activity by the underlined structures of

the rubber very diffuse partnership
processes versus concentrated

power processes and
there might have been first at the start.

One big power the C.U.'s dominates.

Probably like a girl are learning or
reconceptualize if you ask and just say

we live in the world of the subway and
we're not changing because we don't have.

It that's a very good use that
everybody's got a view on

the dynamics of social commerce and highly
decentralized process could be right.

It's kind of interesting.

Maybe there's a lot of play.

You might discover their tactics or
recognizable patterns over clusters of

people come up with a polite
one per year in that case.

Again it's so impactful work negotiation
always starts to look like our national or

interpretation is a disability is
an interpretation is a is a go if you're

going by the patient mean that there
are good press that you find were good.

If I'm sure it's going to be in there you
know where there's no Cape Verde that's

going to do so but
everything you're saying hands is for

me music to my ears because you really
got this have a good start of how I moved

in this process and
I can think of various ways in which that

I parked my former understanding of
the rational choice neoclassical economics

in which I was brought up to where I
came and I think it was sort of for me.

Another good number of things one of
course was working with Jim Rose and

I was always a jerk peer find yourself in
a conceptual jailbreak Jaeger conceptual

view to come out of it but the other
major thing was being in Geneva and

talking to negotiators and
realizing that I was in protect ready.

Everything that they were doing from
this sort of strategic interaction model

that every study.

If I are in most of its force play and
and not really listening

to what they were saying until it did I
was a visiting scholar there probably

got to sit in the position as if there's
a math problem solving happening here and

then many issue areas etc that I
had knocked working up to before.

And that meant that I had to move from and

that to mean in terms of think of
negotiation as a whole who was where I

thought about the most well it's not
really just trading off concessions and

compromises that just
a fertilizer problem solving.

That's when it began to suggest itself
as a problem of global governance.

Now we do have cooperated outcomes
where the other people went along and

signed their name and then I began to
think of this concerns about it to them

a see that I think the English School
of the constructivists rates for us.

What does it mean to
have global legitimacy.

Do we mean legitimacy in this what Barry
and sensible really answer do we mean

legitimacy in an intersubjective sense
of everybody buys into what it means to

be legitimate in that sense I in
the book I talk about how I come.

I'd borrow you know where I was very
careful to hope that because I had to

be in that at some level I'm I'm borrowing
from ethnographic methods and I mentioned

that in passing and and hermeneutics
which is where interpretation comes in.

Now but it was only because the I.R.

theory of marvelous works suggesting to me
ways in which I could understand my data

which is in this case
our qualitative data.

I'm with you on.

Thinking through negotiations last time do
talking I have to talk of the Course I'm

designing for next semester It's called
Global Governance and deliberation.

And and to me in the GO station
is a form of deliberation.

But we don't people for you think of
negotiation as a calm of diplomacy

which predicated in this sort
of strategic environment.

But when you think of negotiations as of
one particular form of deliberation and

a palm of deliberation which can be.

Course it or it can be problem solving.

I begin the book with paying homage to one
of my favorite here is power of prayer.

Right and powerful and
he's a radical thinker and

I'm sure somebody's going to say how
could he take from where to go and

put them all into one book but
from a frame it is very instructive

to us in terms of where is it that the
people who speak and speak with a voice.

And Hirshman who doesn't pay
homage to a predator say Herschel

results speak in the voice and accept and
loyalty and those have a broader process.

So where is that empowered to
participate in something versus where

they're just brought in into a corner into
an environment where they feel corpse

and that kind of staying close to in this
particular pope to a definition of power.

MARGARET To me helps me it
is bridge that gap where we.

I think we found ourselves in a conceptual
jail where it's we're only able to explain

strategic interactions I'm trying
to open up our bridge to where it's

non-strategic now in terms of
the obvious sort of elephant in the room

here is Alexander went and
I found his marvelous very instructive.

But imperfect Religious Right
there was nothing there.

You know his ontologies of
world politics that made them.

And I wanted to go a step beyond and

say this is what it would
look like in a Pyrrhic.

That's my former economic spectrum you
don't say anything that you can't back up

with some kind of data in this particular
case mostly qualitative data and so

when it's here you have
a structural politics is

an ontological understanding
of that structure and

then he stands us towards the beginning of
his book The Summit of the doctor here.

The theory or for that Terry.

Never forget when spoken but
right at the beginning he says the reader

is looking for an empirical understanding
of these issues will be disappointed.

So it's going to be ideas all the way down
but he's not going to get his hands dirty

by saying how do these ideas translate
into a pyrrhic of details and

so what I'm trying to do here is to
sure what are the details of the just

subjective understandings when is
it that they didn't negotiate or

said you know what services
might be in our interests or

where Susan Benz from
the European Union says Hi I hear you.

David bags and I now know what
you mean by this are out of

beer simple question your

work tended application business
level too low to matter for

us for Europe whatever conducting
there to go for the hard.

Product or merger or anything.

In addition to probability of it.

Good.
Could it be used or is it tended to by

corporate world were presenting other

our business heads.

This was right there.

It's very possible here it's done is

where people are really getting paid

very very wise in that way.

I mean that's really great because right
now the market is a used car business.

That's a great business for

us to see all of those places.

It is always

about what you say you know
this could apply to every

person that buy cars whatever creation.

Your own

salesperson right.

Why does.

He doesn't need a car the same cars.

But just like you know
generalizable negotiation.

So there's just one way to get there's
a people negotiate for Cars two parties

are want to play another
want to sit around and

say I need a better way to get to work and
I don't even know what it is.

I just got the problem.

I can't play.

You know I know I can just get a car but
I would think it was a little better.

So somehow your car salesman transit
person you all sit around and

say what should we do here and
then that's it then that someone is so

ill conceived of this
explicitly problem solving.

Maybe you can almost see anyone.

It's one of the great

stories of course

really really

really hard.

And you know

you.

Really just really wanted

to close with this.

So somebody pointed out
a very early part of this.

Where you say a reference

VERY VERY VERY VERY

VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY

you know he was talking about.

OK I'm doing OK OK so

you this is an agent you conceptualize
us as a kind of agency agent.

So you've got a bunch of other
smaller agents for a large.

How taking a structuralist now and
I look at the concentration of the future.

And again some of the things
Congress have kind of touched on so

maybe this is about how
about saying OK but actors

act structure fires and depending on
the structures that are in place.

Different constellations of the actors
will end up coming together

will be better positioned
to reach consensus.

So you know what's going on in these
negotiations are social problems so

construct the prophecies conceptualizing
paid services and supplies play.

So let's say what we're trying to explain
just the conceptualisation Little Murders.

Why did they.

Why did they conceive of train
services in the way that they

might be like under
the different concepts.

So you have to live there but
maybe you could say

well actually the agents in this case use
a different standard operating procedure.

There are different
institutional framework so

there are different rules of access
to the background structural features

that are the parameters of
the actual the Cape process and

that's really background structural So
you can take it to the structural heart.

Let me just say why not go because

I was very tired

you know it was a big

deal because there.

Really was experience.

What is it Mark.

I mean

it's very

cheap.

Very

very

sorry.

Do you

agree

or disagree here.

He's come

here.

They probably were here

to advise me what

exactly they were so interested

in case of the ghost getting to yes.

During the day they talk
about trying to make the ship

to the same table sitting together.

Just like this people.