What got right

or wrong

style.

Right

right.

But.

Thank you thank you Adam.

This is my first visit to Georgia Tech.

It's been a real pleasure.

Both to walk through your beautiful campus
and to interact with the very impressive

faculty and the students with whom I've
met in April two thousand and nine.

President Barack Obama gave a stirring
speech in Prague in the Czech Republic.

In which he made two very important
statements about nuclear weapons.

First he said and
I quote clearly and with conviction.

America's he restated clearly and
with conviction.

America's commitment to seek
a world without nuclear weapons.

And second he said to put an end to Cold
War thinking we will reduce the role of

nuclear weapons in our national security
strategy and urge others to the saying.

Now that first statement a conviction
of America's commitment.

To seek a world without nuclear
weapons was widely cited but

I find it to be really not
a very radical statement indeed.

All he is saying is what Sam Nunn Bill
Perry Henry Kissinger George Schultz and

many others have said which is the United
States should have that as our long

term goal because it is
the law of the United States.

Right.
Is that because Article six of

the nonproliferation treaty was signed and
ratified by the US Senate and

in that treaty Article
six says that the nuclear

weapon states in the nuclear weapon
states should work in good faith for

the eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons and since a ratified treaty is

the law of the land all that that
is saying is that we should follow

our laws it doesn't say how we're going
to do that doesn't set a date for it.

And the president said this
many take I'm not naive.

This may not occur in my lifetime but
that's our goal and

we should work towards that goal.

The second comment however that we
will reduce the role of nuclear

weapons in our national security
strategy has become very controversial.

There was last year a congressionally
mandated commission

on what the nuclear posture should
be regardless of whether McCain or

Obama won the election.

And that commission was divided half.

Republicans put in by the Republicans
in the Senate half Democrats put in.

And could not reach a very strong.

Consensus position.

Precisely on this question
of how to reduce the role or

should we reduce the role of us in the
nuclear weapons and US national security

policy of the paper that some
of you have read the case for

no first use was written for
that commission and.

Many people on the commission thought this
was very helpful and others thought this

was a very dangerous idea even though
I'm not alone by any means and

holding the idea that the United States
should say that the purpose of

nuclear weapons is to deter
to deter other countries

from getting from to other countries
from using their nuclear weapons and

we will use nuclear weapons solely
to protect ourselves our allies.

And our troops overseas.

From the possibility that another country
wouldn't use nuclear weapons against us.

And when.
I've talked about this here and overseas

there many people say I thought we already
had that policy especially in the end

of the Cold War perhaps during the Cold
War it was understandable when we faced

an overwhelming conventionally powerful
Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union.

So suitable that we had that policy.

You need to tell me that we
haven't changed that policy and

answers yes we have not
changed that policy indeed.

We've gone even further to
have first use options.

During the last decade.

There was a nuclear posture
review at the beginning of

the Bush administration that posture
review was leaked to the press.

It was publicly presented an unclassified
version than the classified version was

leaked to the press and in that it
advocated maintaining our nuclear first

strike options for

three for three basic reasons one in case
we had a conventional power that was so

powerful that overwhelmed us and
we needed to respond.

Try to end a war by using nuclear
weapons first even though I have

a hard time imagining what that
conventional power would be.

Second it made an argument
about biological and

chemical weapons out talk about
in more detail momentarily.

And third most controversially
it said we wanted to

maintain the option of using nuclear
weapons first against Libya Iraq and

Iran non-nuclear weapon
states this by the way

is only in the classified leaked
version not in the official version.

Those are three countries
that were suspected of

moving towards nuclear weapons.

I think in all cases it was true and

still remains true but
the Pentagon planners wanted to

have a capability to use nuclear weapons
first to kick targets in those countries.

Today.

If there was a decision to try to get
rid of their declared weapons program.

Ry do I think if you sit and
look at the balances between

the reasons why we want to move towards
a no first use policy toward versus.

Some of the reasons why in the past we
have maintained that why do I think it

would be useful for the current nuclear
posture review which is scheduled to be

published on March first to

be more forthcoming and
lay out a more restricted policy

after the president said we're going
to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

There is national strategy.

One of the arguments for and
against moving all the way to say.

We need them only to deter us or
our allies.

Today I'm going to walk through seven
arguments and try to leave you with at

least my strong belief that we should move
in that direction although I recognize

how difficult it will be for the president
to sign off on that particular policy.

First.

And no first use argument
that is was hinted at in the.

President's speech is consistent
with the vision of getting to zero.

If you state that the United States

needs nuclear weapons for
a variety of military contingencies.

Other than nuclear weapons

then the idea that you could
go to zero nuclear weapons

simultaneously in a mutual arms control
agreement with many other countries.

Seems moot.

Indeed in arguing against
the zero nuclear weapons vision.

DR KEITH PAYNE.

Who has published a response to my article

has argued that even if all other
countries in the world got rid of their

nuclear weapons we would still
need our nuclear weapons.

Weiss says because other countries might
have chemical or biological weapons and

for our defense.

We need to have nuclear
weapons to deter them.

If we make that argument as the biggest
conventional power in the world.

It's very hard to persuade other people
that they don't need nuclear weapons for

those purposes as well.

So if you want to move towards zero.

It seems to me.

That you should accept this
as our goal and should accept

no first use as a doctrine that is
consistent with that goal saying that

we would need nuclear weapons of other
countries have them to deter deterrence.

But if other countries got rid of
them then we would not need them

we would get would be willing to get
rid of them as well in this sense.

One of the extra not
often discussed elements

of the article six commitment to
work in good faith for the eventual

elimination of nuclear weapons should
be a good faith effort to find other.

I mean just to deter other kinds of
weaponry that might be worrisome to us.

That's point one point two deals
with I think the central most

difficult problem in this debate
about what U.S. nuclear doctrine or

nuclear posture should be which is
the problem of extended deterrence

the United States as a member
of the NATO alliance and

is having strong bilateral
alliances with South Korea.

And with Japan.

Has.

As suggested often had a policy of first

use to protect our allies from
other countries conventional or

nuclear weapons as part of
our alliance commitment and

actually as part of
a nonproliferation policy.

One way of discouraging
allies from getting

their own nuclear weapons was
to say we'll support you.

Indeed we put nuclear weapons on

German and many other NATO allies.

So while under our control.

But so you don't need your own weapons.

We're going to we will protect you with
our own we have ships that will neither

confirm nor deny whether they have nuclear
weapons on them that go into Japanese

ports in Japanese waters in our extended

deterrence has been a very important part
of deterrence throughout the Cold War.

I believe that in today's conditions and
you know for shoes policy could make

a form of extended deterrence more
credible and more effective but

it would be a more tailored more
limited form of extended deterrence.

The phrase is often used many
of you rather read this or

heard it or used it yourself.

And I find myself without thinking
often falling into this trap.

He will talk about the nuclear umbrella.

We have a nuclear umbrella over our
allies and that helps protect them.

Indeed Secretary Clinton said that we now

need a nuclear umbrella over people in the
Middle East if Iran gets nuclear weapons.

I think the term nuclear
umbrella should be banned from

the strategic lexicon that we use
in this country for two reasons.

First off it implies some kind of
magical shield that protects people

when it's not a shield a doll it's an
authentic of club that would be used for

retaliation purposes and
we should be blunt and honest about that.

But secondly and even more importantly
the term nuclear umbrella and

indeed the coming phase
of extended deterrence

does not differentiate between
two very different policies.

The first is a form of extended deterrence
that says we promise to defend you.

If necessary by responding with
nuclear retaliation to any country

that attacks the with nuclear weapons and
the second which says

we will respond if necessary with
nuclear weapons to any attack on you.

Whether it's with a conventional military
strike or a biological or chemical strike.

We conflate those two.

So when people sometimes say If
you have a no first use policy.

You're going abandon the allies and
they're going what nuclear weapons.

I say no absolutely not.

And no

first use policy maintains very strictly
that if someone attacks us or our allies.

We will respond appropriately
with a nuclear.

Their.

Retaliation.

It would not leave them defenseless
from a nuclear attack against them

a conventional attack would be under this
policy have to be met by other means

at least the military would be asked
to play on to do this with other means

and there is in the literature
about deterrence an often noted

come at the deterrence is
a product of two things about

the the costs that you are threatening to

place on someone if they attack you or
your ally and

the credibility of that that is
the believability of it and I find today.

Some of the scenarios that people will use
to try to say we need to maintain a very

aggressive first strike option to defend
our allies to be quite incredible.

So it might be massive in
terms of the threat but

not very believable in response
to my arguments one senior member

of the Bush administration
now in a private capacity.

Said You know you might be right about
some of our major allies they would be so

worried about it but what about Lithuania.

We need to maintain nuclear weapon options

to stop Russia from active
use against Lithuania

in my view that would be I can understand
why someone might be worried about

the Russians putting pressure on Lithuania
will any or any of the Baltic states.

But the idea that the United States would
use nuclear weapons against another

massively arm nuclear weapons state.

Over Lithuania is so incredible is so.

Unbelievable.

But our efforts to try to state
that we're going to do that

actually undermine the nature of
our commitment to the Lithuanians.

Instead we should say that attack on one
is an attack on all will defend you.

If someone use nuclear
weapons against you.

We feel very committed to retaliation.

But any other contentious will
defend you as best we can given and

you know commitment.

What's the tradeoff there well
it might be a little less costly

if there was a conventional
operation against the Baltic states.

I retaliations that would be less
costly would be far more believable and

I believe in the principle that you should
not threaten to do things that you're not

very likely to do.

I'm grounds that the mixture
of credibility and

costs adds to the effect of deterrence.

Now in the piece in which
I made this argument.

I noted that a number of
senior statesmen responding to

Senator Nunn Dr Kissinger Dr Perry and
Dr shots.

A number of German similarly experienced

senior former statesman had declared
that they agreed with the zero

nuclear weapons division view and
wanted the German government

to declare that it would like to get rid
of nuclear weapons on German soil and

that NATO didn't need a first use threat
given the end of the Cold War And

given that friendly but at least
normalized relations with Russia today.

But recently the German government
has accepted that view has called for

the elimination of all tactical
nuclear weapons they exact number and

exact location of them in Germany
is still classified has called

the German government so.

It is called the negotiations to get
rid of those particular weapons.

Just yesterday.

The Swedish foreign minister and
the Polish foreign minister.

Also called for removing all
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe

calling them quotes dangerous remnants
of a dangerous past and stating.

We still face security
challenges in Europe today.

But for whatever angle you look at it.

There is no role for nuclear weapons in
responding to those security challenges.

In a response to my no first use article.

A French strategist Bruno to stray.

Said well saying you might
be right about the Germans

didn't have the Poles and
the Swedes already agreeing with me but

what about the Japanese
the Japanese would never accept

a no first use policy because of their
own concerns about China and North Korea

were between the time in which Dr Terence
for a published his criticism and

when I was able to respond to criticism
a new government was elected in Japan

and that new government in contrast
to the previous government

noted that there was a contradiction
between Japan's long standing

policy of wanting to get rid of nuclear
weapons and being on the forefront given

their past experience of wanting to
rid the world of nuclear weapons and

their policy of relying on the United
States especially its first use threats.

So the foreign minister both
before he was elected and

then some somewhat crew
more cryptic remarks.

After he was appointed to
the foreign ministry said.

He actually agrees with the notion
the United States should

reduce the role of nuclear weapons
still wants to have security

guarantees but
does not believe that the contingencies.

Other than a nuclear strike on Japan need
to be met with nuclear weapons responses

this I think is one of the most serious
issues that will face the Obama

administration as it pronounces on what
its nuclear doctrine will be next month.

What should it say to its allies
how should it consult with them.

How much weight to give
to them into which ones.

So for example we need is widely
believed in the unclassified literature

that we still maintain nuclear weapons
in Turkey at the Incirlik Air Force Base

those weapons may be vulnerable
to terrorist attack.

It's probably not the best place in the
world to keep their nuclear weapons but

it reassures the Turks that an attack

on them would more likely be
met with a nuclear response and

it gives them some reassurance when they
think about the future of Iran if Iran

gets nuclear weapons they have U.S.
weapons on their soil they could retaliate

in the adventure in the eventuality of
a nuclear attack to me I think that's

going to be the single most important
issue is how do we deal with with Turkey.

Do we maintain those weapons there.

Do we say that we'll respond to
conventional capabilities and

help you with your
conventional capabilities.

One option that I think
is worth considering.

Would be to do what John F. Kennedy
did after the Cuban missile crisis.

Where.
Where he responded to

the Soviet pulling out of

Cuba of the missiles that they had
placed there by privately noting

to the Soviet Union that we're
going to remove our missiles

our nuclear armed Jupiter missiles they
can hit you promptly out of Turkey.

So this is not a quid pro quo.

If you say it's a quid pro quo.

We're not going to do it if you
publicize this but we're going to do it.

It's not a promise.

It is a statement of U.S. policy and

the United States did that to cause
a rupture in the U.S. Turkish relation or

an end of the NATO relationship know
what the United States soon did was to

bring a player submarine under station in

the Mediterranean brought into a Turkish
port and let the Turkish prime minister.

Come on board the ship and
said Sir we have our weapons.

There are not vulnerable they're not
sitting on your soil they couldn't be

attacked because they're underwater
these weapons are to defend you and

we will use them if necessary extended
does not answer require keeping those two

hundred weapons where they are the or the
weapons in Europe the tactical weapons in

Europe although I think Turkey will be the
most difficult issue to wrestle with and

one that we should address
with very strong consultations

the third issue area is chemical and

biological weapons and
that's been one of the biggest issues

since the end of the Cold War
that has driven this policy

of calculated ambiguity the United States
as part of its commitment.

Under the chemical weapons and
biological weapons convention has taken

all chemical biological weapons
either put them in storage for

the chemicals or for the biological
weapons has simply destroyed them all.

Most countries of the world are members
of those conventions most but

not all have honored their commitments
in there is widespread belief in

the United States intelligence community.

That a number of countries
Iraq under Saddam Hussein as

we all know from the W M D discussions.

In one thousand nine hundred one in two
thousand and three people believe Iran

which developed a chemical capability and
used it during the war against Iraq and

people believe tell just me believes
North Korea and perhaps Syria and

perhaps some others have some biological
or some chemical weapons capability.

Do we need nuclear weapons.

To deter them the calculated
ambiguity argument.

Is that since we can't respond in kind
to a biological or chemical attack.

We want to hold open the option
kept at it state that we might

use nuclear weapons in an effort to deter
biological or chemical uses indeed.

Factor Payne who wrote the one
thousand nine hundred one.

It was the senior official in
charge of the of the I'm sorry.

A senior official in charge
of the two thousand and one.

Nuclear Posture Review
that maintained those and

was Commission on the commission and
now has written this response to me

has said because we don't have
chemical and biological weapons.

You're opening up the United States for
an attack by other countries who would use

chemical or biological weapons and
indeed sites.

The more.

In one thousand nine hundred one.

When Saddam Hussein had chemical and
some biological capabilities.

Unlike two thousand and three where
he had already gotten rid of them.

We now know.

And when we attacked to kick
the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.

We issued a vague calculated
ambiguous threat and

Dr Payne notes as many people have he's
not alone as many people segment that

that's what deterred Saddam Hussein
from not using his chemical and

biological weapons and

therefore no first use policy would
be very weak as Dr Payne puts it.

The threats one thousand and one appear
to be the plausible explanation for

Iraqi restraint with regards to
chemical biological weapons they

offer therefore a unique really
effective form of deterrence.

I believe that this historical
case is actually a myth

the evidence does not
suggest if you look in-depth.

That that is why Saddam Hussein.

Did not use the chemical and

biological weapons that he had in
one thousand nine hundred one.

Consider the actual letter.

That George H.W. Bush issued in his

twenty five January one thousand nine
hundred one letter to Saddam Hussein.

He said and I quote.

Should war come it will be a far greater
tragedy for you and your country.

Let me state too that the United States
will not tolerate the use of chemical or

biological weapons where the destruction
of Kuwait's oil fields and installations.

Further you will be held
directly responsible for

terrorist actions against
any member of the Cole.

The American people would demand the
strongest possible response you in your

country will pay a terrible price if you
order unconscionable acts of this sort.

When Secretary of State James Baker
delivered that letter to Iraqi foreign

minister Tariq Aziz Baker according to his

memoirs quotes purposely left
the impression that the use of chemical or

biological agents by Iran would invite
tactical nuclear retaliation by us.

He also warned as these however and again
quote that if Iraq used weapons of mass

destruction quotes our objective won't
be just the liberation of Kuwait.

But the elimination of
the current Iraqi regime.

Well what do we know we have two different
people saying two different things

first to Rica's these the first
Mr Saddam Hussein when asked

prior in the one nine hundred ninety S.
when he was still in power

before the two thousand and three
Gulf War was asked why didn't you used

your chemical weapons that you had and
he cited that particular

threat was he telling the truth.

Did he know what was in
Saddam Hussein's mind an Arab diplomat.

Was quoted in the papers after that
particular statement was made to the U.N.

inspectors.

Spec in the chemical and biological
weapons destructions in Iraq and

their deputy diplomat said Well of course
to Rick as he is going to say that because

it wasn't explained to the Iraqi military
and Iraqi people why they didn't do it.

They want to say.

Not that they were saving their own skin.

That is the regime.

They want to say that they
were really scared of of

attacks on the Iraqi people
with nuclear weapons.

What did Saddam Hussein think
what did he say we lack

any transcript of a meeting between
Saddam Hussein and his cabinet.

But what we do have now ours is own
testimony which was just released in

the last year after the two thousand and
three War you'll recall

that we finally tracked him down and
hidden a location outside of Baghdad.

Put him on trial as part of
that trial did a whole series

of interviews with him before
his execution and let me read.

What he actually said according
to his March two thousand and

four interrogation record Saddam stated

when asked directly about the ambiguous
nine hundred ninety one threats.

He said the use of chemical weapons
didn't cross our mind he was asked how

how would you have been described.

If you had used chemical weapons
we would have been called stupid

by Saddam added that I weapons
of mass destruction were the for

the defense of Iraqi sovereignty and we
demonstrated this by using our weapons of

mass destruction during the Iran Iraq war
when Iran was threatening to go to Baghdad

in the war in one thousand
nine hundred one.

Iraq did not use W M D.

In the one nine hundred ninety one Gulf
War as its sovereignty was not threatened

and that's just to me that it
was the second half of Baker's

statement that if you use chemical or
biological weapons are worrying is

no longer would no longer be to put.

That Kuwaiti sovereignty and
get you out of Kuwait.

It would be to end your regime so

that to because these would not
discuss when they were still in power.

What Saddam Hussein discussed.

Afterwards.

And I add one more point here
is that we now know as well.

In the way that I think reduces
the credibility of future threats in this

regard the President Bush Sr had
decided that even if they used chemical

biological weapons we were going to use
nuclear weapons could to Brant Scowcroft

the national security adviser but
if Iraq used chemical weapons if Iraq

resort to them we would say our reaction
would depend on the circumstances.

We would hold Iraqi divisional commanders
responsible and bring them to justice.

No one advanced the notion of using
nuclear weapons in that contingency and

the president rejected it.

Even in retaliation for chemical or
biological weapons attacks and

short so to Baker was bluffing and

now there's a scary advisor has
acknowledged that we were bluffing.

So we.

This raises serious questions about
whether nuclear weapons shoes

are useful certainly historically
it is question about whether they

did the deterrent action the people claim
that they did nine hundred ninety one and

it raises a whole nother when
thinking about what could really

deter someone from using chemical or
biological weapons.

Instead of saying that we would
retaliate with nuclear weapons and

alternative would be say if you do
this we will hold you accountable and

we will get rid of your regime.

We will make that isn't
our war aim under whatever

scenario we're talking about
a more credible threat one that.

Has a stronger moral component it
would be very difficult to justify

in many scenarios the use of nuclear
weapons against an enemy territory.

Knowing what the noncombatant

cost would be if we retaliated
with nuclear weapons and seems to

me that certainly the debate should shift
into talking about that particular option.

Fourth.

What about terrorism.

Should we have a first use policy or
no first use policy.

How does this affect the likelihood
of nuclear terrorism.

I think that particular set of arguments
favor a no first use policy but

only in a minor way for two reasons one.

As I suggested before when I talked about
extended deterrence today senator and

his enacted by having tactical nuclear
weapons in bases in NATO Europe.

A recent Air Force study argued

that those bases in Europe are far
less secure from terrorist

attacks than are similar
bases in the United States

so that would be point one by reducing
those numbers eliminating them it

would reduce that problem and
point to it would deal a junior mys

the use of weapons of mass destruction
first against innocent civilians here.

I don't think this is going to
influence of Osama bin Laden or

al Qaeda leaders but I do find it.

To be uncomfortable.

To try to go to the world opinion or
our allies and

to say that terrorist attacks
against civilians are immoral.

They are wrong.

That's how we define terrorism.

The deliberate killing of
noncombatants of civilians.

And they say that we will
respond with nuclear weapons.

Which in the vast number of scenarios

means the killing of millions
of innocent civilians

trying to have more consistency

in this area and threatening than any
terrorist attack would be met with.

Fellow retaliation.

But we don't need nuclear weapons for
that but

I think the more consistent and help
deal of Juda mys those kinds of attacks.

A fifth argument about nuclear
weapons proliferation.

Would in no first use policy help.

Or reduce the likelihood
that other states right.

Want to get nuclear weapons for
their own purposes.

And here I think there
are three reasons to

favor a no first use policy the first
because again one of consistency.

We repeatedly Nonproliferation Treaty
review conferences over the years

have told many non-nuclear weapon states
that you don't need to clear weapons.

The more we say we need them for
more purposes for a variety of purposes.

The more likely it is that they will
feel that they need them as well.

If we say we need them because Iran
might have chemical biological weapons.

Won't other countries that
are also worried about Iran.

Also feel like they need nuclear weapons
because of chemical biological weapons.

Second the United States pledged that
passed for Nation Review conferences.

Something else called the negative
security assurance an N.S.A..

Which states that the United States.

I'm paraphrasing here the United States
affect all nuclear weapons states in

the permanent five of the UN have a
similar statement the United States would

not would would promise that it will not
use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear

weapon state unless it is being attacked
by that by that non-nuclear weapon

state in conjunction with another nuclear
weapons state that was the Cold War

exception that we had in case European
allies of the Soviet Union attacked us.

We repeated that the negative
security assurance after the Cold War

and then the classified version
of the two thousand and

one review conference basically
told the people that we were lying.

We were promising major
conferences the U.S.

government officials were saying we
will not use nuclear weapons against you

as part of their commitment to get
them to not get nuclear weapons and

we're telling the Pentagon plan for

nuclear attacks against Libya Iran Iraq
if necessary not helpful.

That particular contradiction
was often pointed out

in further meetings of the Non
Proliferation Treaty review conference.

And the last reason here is that sometimes
I think our rhetoric in this area

actually encourages.

Nuclear weapons interest and other states.

But here I am thinking particularly
of Iran Iraq is a serious

threat and don't get me wrong I think
that we should hold open the options of

using military force if all else
fails to stop the Iranian program

and yet whenever we resort to nuclear
rhetoric and threats to do that.

It strikes me as counterproductive.

Number of years ago there were leaks in
the paper that Pentagon officials had

been asked by the Bush
administration to develop a nuclear

first strike plan to get rid
of the nuclear facilities

in Iraq before they could be used to
make the materials for a nuclear weapon.

Just to ensure that we
could hit more effectively

some of the underground facilities
at times and elsewhere.

At a press conference.

President Bush said that the Iraqi
leadership should know that we will

have a U.N. Security Council
resolution to stop them from

from getting nuclear capabilities but

that that fails all options
are on the table and when asked

by a reporter at the press conference when
you say all options are on the table.

Do you mean nuclear weapons as well
the president looked at the camera and

said all options are on the table.

What was the effect of that.

Well first off in Iran
a number of people said

how can you possibly ask us
to give up our capabilities.

When you're threatening
us with nuclear strikes.

I don't think those particular threats

determined they didn't they were the cause
of the Iranian program but certainly.

It undercut those who wanted to negotiate
away and supported those people

the more hawkish elements in
the Revolutionary Guards in Iran.

Moreover it led to lack of
support among some allies.

So here we're trying to help you
get rid of the Iranian program and

have a negotiated settlement
here it's not helpful for

you guys to use nuclear weapon threats.

To try to do this.

So I think on balance

having more restrained nuclear weapons
policies in the United States including

no first use would help us rather than
hurt us on the nonproliferation front.

Too last points.

Point six.

Unbeknown to many the US nuclear weapons

doctrine has started to be
copied by other countries

as the state with the longest
experience with nuclear weapons.

Has the state with perhaps
the strongest scholarly government

intellectual apparatus
analyzing these issues and

it is the state in which our policies are
more open and more transparent to others.

We put unique leadership
role in this area.

It is very disturbing to note.

As I have that the Indian government
to give the most prominent example.

After the two thousand and one.

Posture Review begin to adopt not just
some of the ideas but some of the language

direct evidence of the effect of some of
our doctrinal statements in two thousand

and three the New Delhi government saying
that we of course have a no first use

doctrine but we hold open the option
of using nuclear weapons.

If someone uses chemical or
biological what weapons again.

Yes and I know from my research
in talking with the people

who drafted that is that they were
directly copying from the U.S. doctrine.

Leading now in India to people
there saying we need to have more

nuclear weapons and
to have a wider range of delivery

vehicles to deliver nuclear weapons in
India because we need to not just to

nuclear weapons but chemical biological
weapons other things as well.

So we inadvertently are actually
encouraging other countries through this

to get more nuclear weapons in seventh

a more political point.

But what I think that's a more important
is that the nuclear dialogue and

discussion and stability that we have the
United States are from the perspective I

think of most people in the world
certainly from my perspective and

I think for many Martian who landed in
the United States quite bizarre and

undisciplined because on the one hand
we talk about wanting to rid the world

of nuclear weapons about horrible
these weapons are and then because of

the habit that we've had of saying well
we might use nuclear weapons first.

OD rhetoric appears and
do the people not even being aware of it.

Let me give you two examples.

During the Democratic debates.

Prior to the nomination
of Barack Obama Obama

made what at the time was a firm and

forceful policy regard.

The use of drones against
Pakistan saying that if we

he was president and
we find al Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan.

We will attack them even
if the Pakistani government

isn't cooperate of about it and
then was asked well how you going do that.

He said Well of course I
would use nuclear weapons.

I'd use a conventional airstrike or
drones of some sort then

Secretary Clinton running against
him smiled in the debate.

Knowing that she could go in for the kill.

So that's irresponsible US
president should never take nuclear

weapons off the table.

That's going to weaken deterrence.

But think about that is it reasonable and
responsible

saying we're going to use nuclear weapons
against our and against the territory

of our ally to take out a terrorist
camp would be the effects of doing that.

I got a note from a Pakistani retired

general who's actually deeply involved
with their nuclear weapons program saying.

So can you explain to me
what's going on here.

These are the guys who are in the more
liberal side of your political doctrine.

One of them was to attack us with
conventional The other was to use nuclear

weapons against us.

They said no they don't want to do that
you know that American politics but

it said an awful lot about the ease and
the lack of discipline.

There are cold war thinking has gotten
us into the second example here

was more recent where children the head

of the Strategic Command was asked about
early thinking about U.S. cyber defenses.

And there's a lot of work to be done and

it's a very serious long term
threat that we face but at.

Asked was asked what options
are on the table a swarm of

their nuclear weapons are one
option we would have and

so he said would you want
to use nuclear weapons.

If someone uses a cyber attack against us.

So why would we ever want to restrict
the president's options here.

We want to have that option and
we should have a ties an option.

There's a former U.S. military planner.

I can understand that
perspective from the narrow

perspective of would you
want to have options open.

Yes but as I've suggested if you add up.

The politicization costs
the cost in terms of disarmament.

The ability to maintain a more
tailored form of extended to turn.

I think we should and
I hope the president does decide

that sometimes it's in our interest
to restrict our own options and

adopt a more tailored nuclear doctrine
that says we need nuclear weapons to deter

other states nuclear weapons and
for no other purpose there and

I'm looking forward to questions
comments thank you for

the questions or comments.

But what

we've seen

we all

know

what your what.

You know.

All right.

What we do know is that the Chinese
already say that that's their policy and

even though it's virtually
impossible as it would be for

the just look into us to know that there's
no sort of classified secret doctrinal

statements to their military the fact is
that many in the military range in China.

You actually see Chinese military
officers as American officers would

complain that you're tying their hands.

We want to have more options and to me
that's the best evidence that the Chinese

political leadership has told them you
should plan not to use nuclear weapons

even if someone uses biological weapons
against just use conventional means

a plan to do that and create
the capability to do that the British and

I think the Indians would easily follow
suit that the United States the real hard

nuts to crack would be the Russians
the pack size and the French but

I would say that even
without mutual disarmament.

Something has to be done together reducing
the rows of nuclear weapons strikes me

as something that does not always need to
be done together that even if the Russians

say look right now we're so weak that
we need to have a first use option

that doesn't strike me as something
that's against that that's so

violating American interest that we'd
want to reverse our no overshoes policy.

Well I consider myself
a reluctant realist.

A realist who faces looking at
the world and knows that all states

may not always be perfectly rationally but
try to behave rationally

and that this often leads to unfortunate
and sometimes tragic consequences.

That said I think the real issue
except that if you are too aggressive.

It actually encourages other countries
to behave more aggressively to you

and that our policies.

Sometimes in the name of deterrence
sometimes just because we're not certain

how other countries will behave can
sometimes lead other countries.

To do things in response that harms
our interests in the long term first

John Murtha Shimer from the University
of Chicago is famous for calling for off

incivility them to be really aggressive
in the name of realism and I pointed

out that authentic of has two terms as
two meanings in the English language.

It can mean.

Strength first to be offensive.

I can football work in mean noxious and

sometimes we forget that as realists will
talk in terms that I think lead others

to react more negatively to us with
respect to the N.P.T. in the article six.

There are some people have said that
the United States never really intended to

meet that commitment that that
was meter window dressing.

It was a sop to the public opinion.

In other countries especially
in the nuclear weapons states so

that they could let their
legislatures join this treaty.

I think there's an element of truth to
that there were some people in the U.S.

government you know historically looking
at signing the treaty who held that view.

There are others who
actually truly believed.

That it's our long term national interest
to work towards the eventual the nation's

nuclear weapons and
I would say it really doesn't matter

why we signed that even if you take
that position that this is just for

domestic public opinion not nuclear
weapon states a good realist would say.

But that matters.

It matters that the Egyptian
public is not pushing the Egyptian

government to get nuclear weapons.

It matters that the public
in the United Arab Emirates

which has just signed on to major
construction of nuclear power is not

pushing their government to get nuclear
weapons and therefore we should do what we

can acknowledging that this is
a long term objective to state

that we will work in good
faith towards that goal

even while acknowledging that is going to
be a long time a difficult road ahead.

Whenever someone says I have
a need naive question that's a set

up there's going to be
a real tough question.

I say right

now on

why you're here.

Why you're here.

The logic is

one of your rock Compellent if if

a state thinks that you
might actually do that

you might attack first with conventional
weapons or nuclear weapons.

It might actually persuade them to

not develop the capabilities
that could get them.

To have nuclear weapons in the long term.

So people will look at the Israeli policy
against Saddam Hussein in nine hundred

eighty taking out those a rycote reactor
before it can produce plutonium or

will look at the Israeli
policy in two thousand and

seven attacking a Syrian
suspected reactor site.

And say that if we tell the Iranians that
no matter what you do willed negotiate but

if there's no military
option on the table.

Why why won't they go forward and
try to develop nuclear weapons and

maybe you can make a deal but

this would add one extra potential cost
to include the nuclear option on that.

However then plays so badly.

That it increases rather than decreases
that is it's a threat that goes

too far in terms of the rhetoric and
in terms of how this

plays both among our allies and among the.

People in Iraq.

So you'd have to ask face President Cheney
why he pushed that issue so hard.

But I think his belief was that in
the long term this kind of threat is more

likely to lead Iran to be cautious and
not move forward in nuclear weapons.

I think he was wrong.

Is that naive question
is a difficult question.

Because to me it seems so
obviously wrong headed.

And yet clearly this was
something that had lots of

resonance inside the Bush White House so

much that the president himself
made that statement I quoted.

Well

that's a good that's a great question.

Excellent question is some.

So Called be clear a Tory policy.

Just what you say to persuade people.

It doesn't have any real impact
I don't think that's right.

And someone who used to work inside
a winner list room in the basement of

the Pentagon where we did
nuclear war planning.

I know that statement that
the president would make.

Guidance that would come down would have
an impact as we try to figure out what

should we be doing what are the
operational details now there were so

much classified things that did.

Cut against some some public rhetoric but
but it matters what people say is

certainly matters what a posture
review tells tells the military.

The question is how can
other people believe it but

one thing to do is try to do
an unclassified version indeed it has been

suggested and I think as far as
I know this is going to happen

that there will be only an unclassified
there will be an a transparent.

Nuclear Posture Review
statement made there clearly

would have been classified analyses
going on in the background but

the actual posture review I've been
told precisely on this ground will be

issued as a public document
innovation very interesting.

I hope this happens would be very
interesting and then second if so

what military consequences in terms
of operational deployments could

you have these could range from and
there's low and

take out tactical nuclear
weapons out of NATO countries.

And I suggested the Turks
would be the biggest issue.

There.

The Germans I think would be would
welcome such and such an action and

that would say look these purposes that
we've talked about using in the past we

don't need them anymore.

The second more radical statement it

has been some people have proposed
getting rid of us I.C.B.M. force and

rely upon two legs of
the so-called triad the submarine

launched ballistic missiles which
are the least vulnerable force and

a handful that are here for
a smaller number of

gravity bombs which you'd want to have for
redundancy in case

the s.o.b arms the submarines ever became
vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare

that would be the most
extreme form of putting your

operations deployments where your
doctrine says that they would go.

Do I think the mission will go that far.

No I don't think so but there have been
serious discussions of that I know

you're

getting a great question.

You're right the Pakistanis
have nuclear weapons by and

large because of the fear of
the Indian conventional attack.

They also however have viewed
their nuclear weapons as

a shield behind which they
can do things against India

that helps cause the Indian
conventional threat against them.

So the strongest case in point
is the nine hundred ninety

nine cargo war where we now know.

Then chief of army staff
Musharraf crafted a plan

to put Pakistani forces
disguised as guerrilla fighters.

Into Indian held Kashmir Europe to cut
off Indian supply routes to the North Sea

action glacier and hopefully spread
revolution in insurgency in Kashmir.

He told the prime minister later.

Now i Sharif India can't respond
because we have nuclear weapons so

nuclear weapons in that case
helped encourage aggression.

Then we came in and

we're very hard harsh on them saying
that unless you pull those guys out.

We're not going to constrain India.

So first thing we do is get involved
between India and Pakistan as we did then

we also in my view can help privately
those that privately they are not very

open manner to help protect the Pakistani
arsenal from their own terrorist problem.

Which is much bigger there than in
virtually any other country that has

nuclear weapons and
September eleventh two thousand and

one was in a hotel in
Washington getting ready for

a briefing at the National Security
Council staff about what if anything

should the United States do to help the
Pakistanis protect their nuclear weapons.

It was ironic that mean it was going to be
held on the day that the United States was

attacked by the most massive terrorist
attack that we've had in our history

the meeting was postponed was held later.

All the details are classified but DAVID
SANGER New York Times in his recent book

The Inheritance reports that there are
over one hundred million dollars of U.S.

assistance given to
the Pakistani military.

To help them.

Protect their weapons from the al Qaeda or
a Talabani or an insider.

Coming in to pass on here.

The codes are here here here here here
is where the guards are operating or

a guard letting somebody in so that's
a policy that's not widely known the full

details are clipped classified and
I think probably for good reason

I don't think we want to have a ties
everything that we've done in that regard.

Moreover a singer reports we do not know
how well the Pakistani army has instituted

or how well they've used the technology or
the training that we've given them for

physical security because they don't
want us to know all the details of

how they operate their forces because then
they fear that we abide by the past and

the Indians or we might do it ourselves
and attack them but seems to me that

that's a useful thing that we can do
outside of our doctrine discussion but

rather a more military to military or
lab to lab program

where

we'll know more.

In May when the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty review conference opens

in New York City and
they're going to meet for three weeks to

try to come up with a final document that
would say Here's the status of the treaty.

Here's what's going well
here's was not going well and

here are steps that we could take to.

Forward my initial

reading of some doctors coming out from
other countries in preparation for

this and at track two meetings I
have attended around the world in

the last year that is that the Prague
speech for most non nuclear weapon states

has been very very welcomed
the recommitment to zero

saying they are finally you're the
president is actually saying not just on

the first day of the review conference but
say much earlier that they're waiting to

see what the posture review says because
of the second half of that statement and

I fear that the other logic of
the logic says maintain your options

deter chemical biological weapons use the
kind of things that from a narrow military

perspective seem reasonable
may win the debate.

If that happens I think
it will not be a very

good outcome at the nonproliferation
review Congress where other countries will

say the president promised
something he's not delivering.

That's what I'd say one extra point here
is is by far the most important thing for

the non-nuclear weapon states
because this is important

the posture review the rhetoric
the commitment again.

But the other thing is very important
is the conference of Test Ban Treaty

in one thousand nine hundred five
when we negotiated at the N.P.T.

review conference to get
the treaty put in perpetuity.

That there's a clause in the original
treaty that said After twenty five

years they'll be a vote.

I whether to keep this treaty in
perpetuity the promise that that that we

would get the conference of
test ban side the two thousand.

We agreed that we're going
to actually get signed.

Within two years we actually said
we're going to push in and do this.

And the good news was
that we got assigned.

The bad news is that
the Senate then rejected it.

And so
a number of non-nuclear weapon states

have said hey this is great
that the president now is said.

Unlike President Bush that he
wants to get this treaty ratified.

But he needs sixty seven votes and
it's not clear that that's going to happen

because as we see in so
many issues in Washington today.

There's a real failure
of cooperation even on.

You know even to make compromises
that might seem very reasonable.

So unless there's movement
forward on the comprehensive test

ban unless this treaty meeting goes well

in May I think we're going to have
some real problems on our hands

to add little detail what is the actual.

Kind of scenario that you have in mind

domestic threats sort of with the message
threats Yeah I would hope that or

no circumstance would we
use nuclear weapons on U.S.

soil against some kind of domestic
threat if that if that's what

you mean I can't imagine
a terrorist if if this is

what you have in mind a terrorist
either being this a deterred by.

American threats.

Nor can I imagine very many
scenarios in which you can

find a plausible reason why we'd want to
use nuclear weapons against a particular

target in those kinds of conflicts but
I would say that your your point

raises one think important issue that
gets back to your point about rhetoric is

I hope that President Obama does
not let himself get drawn into

too many hypotheticals
because you can always

creatively think about
some bizarre contingency

that you might say yeah we should keep
open the option for for that no matter how

unlikely it is and I can understand why
someone would would make that argument.

But when they do that they're forgetting
all these other costs the costs of

nonproliferation the cost our rhetoric
have in terms of encouraging other people

think that they need weapons
to the cost it has in terms of

other countries than adopting more
aggressive nuclear policies themselves and

wanting more nuclear weapons.

So I could imagine there could be some
scenario that I haven't thought of

I don't want to rule that out but
we should take those serious those

unusual scenarios with
an appropriate grain of salt.

Yes.

Yeah I don't think we can avoid that and
I think the trick in the long term is the.

To have a form of deterrence

that does not require
active nuclear arsenals.

As long as we have knowledge.

About how to build nuclear weapons.

We can never get rid of this dilemma.

You see down the road.

What if lots of people

have this knowledge isn't the first
person to get nuclear weapons.

I do that scenario more likely to
use them and they answer is yes and

that therefore and this is one of
the many hard tasks in imagining

a world with no nuclear weapons this
how can we have enough transparency so

that we would know that if another country
is starting to build nuclear weapons.

Again that we would be able to do.

And recreate that form
of mutual deterrence.

I don't see how we can get out
of that particular dilemma.

But I do think that if we work really
creatively if we put in half as much money

into designing a robust detection

system as we do now into having
a robust nuclear deterrent.

That we could work that problem.

And there's a lot of actually very
creative work being done at Stanford and

elsewhere about how to think
about low numbers and zero.

And how to create more transparency
instability not an easy task but

what I think that could be accomplished.

A

lot of literature on this we were
analyzing this I think I think the bottom

line is quite clear is that nuclear.

Weapons certainly during the Cold War.

Did reduce the likelihood of
conventional wars and that.

I'm not a person who believes that
deterrence doesn't have an effect.

I think I think it did I think
what we miss however is that.

That effect is not perfect.

Citing for example that one thousand
nine hundred nine cargo war which

was a war between two
nuclear armed states.

So it's not a perfect
form of deterrence and

it creates another set
of risks of accidents.

Risk of terrorists act.

Acquiring weapons that have
to be weighed against.

The convention the reduction
in conventional activities.

So in my way of thinking as someone
who worked with nuclear weapons and

helped aim them and was and involved
in some of the planning process during

the Cold War in nuclear weapons using
nuclear weapons to maintain peace.

I've written is like
walking across thin ice.

The fact that we pulled it
off during the Cold War

does not mean that we should
practice it over and over again.

Does not mean that we should encourage
other countries to get nuclear weapons.

So that they can take some of the same
risks in other words this was a risky to

turn to a deterrent but
nonetheless a risky one.

Credibility is one of those
words that it's hard to know is

that.

Yeah I mean I think it could be
a deterrent yes how to measure the.

Estimated probability
that we would do that.

Versus other threats I don't know where
do you know I mean this near you would

have in mind here would be
what if Iran goes forward with

a nuclear program or what if there's
a U.S. attack against them and

they use chemical weapons against U.S.
bases there would be a kind scenario if

we're Israel attacks in the Tods facility
so they can't get a nuclear bomb at least

in the short term they respond with some
kind of chemical attack against U.S.

ships or a U.S. base in the region which
is more believable here challenging

was it really believe it will that we
go get rid of the regime in Tehran.

I don't know is really
believe it will that we would

use nuclear weapons against them.

I don't know those would be the tradeoffs
that you have to assess and from my

way of thinking I can't tell you which
is more believable than the estimated

probabilities that in reining in
leadership would have I can tell you what

I think is more likely that the American
public would support and I have to meet

there I think you have a point many people
you know seems to see just Newcomb.

And the president would have to
be constrained to restrained in

his rhetoric and his response.

Under those conditions.

There would be others who would
say no we don't want to do that.

The one piece of a.

Evidence I can say it is not perfect
evidence that all was from a series of war

games that were held in the National
Defense University a number of years ago

run by the Nobel Laureate Thomas Schilling
one of the great.

Nuclear strategists of all time.

And showing reports that in this scenario
this was before two thousand and

three he had Saddam Hussein
secretly having developed a small

nuclear arsenal and that when we

kicked them out of Kuwait a second time
as we did nine hundred ninety one.

So nuclear weapons went off at U.S.
bases in the Persian Gulf

and he asked the zero five zero six or so.

Lieutenant colonels and
colonels to gameplay this in give

advice how would you know what
kind of advice would you gave.

And he reports that to a man.

I think they were all men they

said that their advice
was to go to Baghdad and

get rid of Saddam Hussein not to
respond with nuclear weapons and

the logic of it was not just sort
of moral repugnance it wasn't just

a sense of of a nuclear taboo per others

a sense of if we're going
to get countries not to do

this again we shouldn't respond in kind.

We should respond even
more effectively and

saying that there is something wrong
that can that's limited evidence.

It's hypothetical or
it was it was a it was a game but

I have found that there is something
quite profound that the military officers

when facing that scenario
devised in their kind of manner.

It's a great question.

But more questions.

Let me

just.

Well let

me.

Yeah but
these are really two issues one is

in terms of the role of global
anti-ballistic missiles in moving us

towards a world of zero I think this
transition from an office of deterrence

to a defensive deterrent
is absolutely essential.

And you're suggesting I think
appropriately that even if an A.B.M.

system is not really effective
today with it with large arsenals.

It could be part of that process to
answer that earlier question about

that low numbers were at zero.

This could provide some protection so
that if someone DOES cheat

you have time to respond without
being threatened the same way.

So missile defenses in the.

World I think are important.

With respect to missile
defenses in Iran today.

Those are more tactical nature much more
effective than some of the long range

anti-ballistic missile
systems that were deployed.

I do worry however that
we should not signal Iran

that we're going to accept they're
developing nuclear weapons.

I say we're going to put a shield
over over our allies in the Gulf or

put a shield over the Turks.

Now one scenario or

one thinking is that that what's
going on right now is telling Iran.

You better be careful.

Except the U.N. Security Council
resolutions or there may be an attack and

we will defend against your retaliation.

That I think is what is
the under lying message there.

That's way.

That's

right.

Yeah there are lots of studies
about this and indeed.

Adam is co editing a book that
brings in a group of five

scholars analyzing the trends in
nuclear proliferation over time

both in terms of his causes consequences
to be very brief I think what

we've found is that the nonproliferation
treaty had an enormous impact.

John F. Kennedy thought that in
the nineteen seventies we didn't do

something about there'd be twenty twenty
five states with nuclear weapons.

Today we only have nine.

So it's been there hasn't been
as bad as as it could have

been what comes with that is that there
are many countries that have developed.

Nuclear technology that
should they choose to go

develop nuclear weapons will be easier for
them to do so.

So we have more latent
nuclear weapon states but

far fewer then could be
without the treaty and

that's why what happens in a New York
in May is absolutely essential.

We need to convince the non-nuclear
weapon states that we're doing our bit to

keep our commitment under Article six to
work in good faith words eventual nation.

You need to continue your process
of building nuclear power.

If you want it but having I.A.E.A.
inspections and pledging that you're not

going to use this technology to
build its most harmful weaponry

components and
that's far that bargain has worked but

it's a rather fragile agreement and
that we need to protect it.

With all the effort that we can.

It's already I saw one more
hand over there that's

again

a great question.

I think there is enormous
Syria are obviously well

aware of the difference being tactical
weapons and atomic weapons versus hydrogen

weapons too Sage weapons and we shouldn't
conflate them clearly the Indian and

Pakistani arsenals are much smaller
in numbers much lower in yield

much a lot less accurate
in terms of their accuracy

in terms of their ability to
deliver weapons on targets.

And that's said when you think about the.

First use issue I would argue that it
doesn't matter that much in terms of

the effects of a limited use of
nuclear weapons would matter

enormously obviously to people on the
ground or people within fallout range but

if any country uses nuclear weapons again
it's going to create a different world.

We have benefited enormously
from the tradition of

nonuse that has existed since
nine hundred forty five

not active use if another
countries use nuclear weapons.

Even if it's in a tactical way even if it
only kills military a military base and

doesn't kill lots of civilians.

I would think that the world
reaction to this would be enormous.

Which way would it go to create with
revulsion and spur disarmament.

Or would it create anger and
defensiveness and

wind to get nuclear weapons in
more hands to protect themselves.

I don't know it's an experiment
that I hope we don't ever have

to face or
concluding let me know something one.

I want to thank you.

MacArthur Foundation for

its generous support allowed us
to actually host a nice guest.

I also want to thank our program assistant
is that into Levin or making sure

you all got here and didn't get lost
in the libraries of previous forum and

I also want to remind all of you
that on Thursday we'll have another

very important speaker that will
be talking about energy and

international security not just in
the nuclear I'm with that let me ask

you all to join me in
thanking our speaker today.

Thank you thank you.

Question.