Is Columbia a Different Neighbor?
A Comparative Analysis of University Real Estate Acquisition Practices
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Introduction:

From Columbia’s initial purchase of 32 acres in Morningside Heights in 1892 to the present day, the university has grown to become one of the largest landowners within New York City. Like many other longstanding urban educational institutions, Columbia’s presence is deeply embedded within the history and growth of its urban environment. Throughout their historical relationship, the respective interests of both university and city have been largely compatible. Columbia’s growth has required the city’s approval and at times, facilitation, while the city benefits from the economic, social, and cultural benefits of an elite educational institution. In regard to the city’s residents, however, Columbia’s interests of institutional expansion have often diverged from that of its surrounding residents, contributing to a long history of poor community relations. Real estate acquisition for the purpose of campus expansion is perhaps the most contentious aspect between community-university relations both historically and today, as it is often characterized by a lack of transparency and an inability to adequately consider community impact.

The tension within Columbia’s history with the Morningside Heights community surpasses merely a lack of consideration, and instead is rooted in the targeted removal of Black and Puerto Rican residents during Columbia’s major period of property acquisition from 1950 to 1970. In accordance with the time period’s general ideology of spatial regulation, Columbia attempted to confront the “disorder” within its surroundings by targeting both these minority populations and residents of the neighborhoods’ Single Room Occupancy buildings (SROs), primarily through real estate acquisitions. With the pace of Columbia’s building purchases, from 1960 to 1970 alone Columbia removed 6,800 SRO tenants from its surrounding area in Morningside Heights (Kahn, 1970, 87). By 1970, Columbia had utilized the era’s urban renewal approach to transform the Morningside Heights neighborhood on a level that few other nonprofit or single profit-making landowners could accomplish.
In 2003, Columbia announced plans for its Manhattanville expansion, an additional 6.8 million square feet of university space to be used for classrooms, research facilities, administration, housing and parking, which would require the complete redevelopment of seventeen acres between West 125th to West 133rd streets (Marcelin, 2016). In light of the university’s troubled relationship with its surrounding community, Columbia immediately promised that the expansion would involve a collaborative partnership with the residents of Harlem. On the topic, Columbia’s president Lee C. Bollinger stated: “I’ve done everything I can to put the ghost of the gym behind us. Columbia is a different neighbor now (Bagli, 2004).” “The ghost of the gym” refers to the pinnacle of Columbia’s tensions with the community, the 1968 campus rebellion in which students and local residents protested Columbia’s expansion into Harlem and the construction of a gymnasium in Morningside Park. The aftermath of the protests included the abandonment of the gymnasium plans, the resignation of university president Grayson Kirk, and largely the end of Columbia’s major real estate acquisition era.

This research will examine if Columbia truly is a different neighbor now, primarily through the lens of the university’s real estate acquisition practices. In examining Columbia’s real estate acquisition throughout the course of its two major expansionary periods, this paper will specifically explore the number of buildings Columbia has acquired, the strategic pattern of acquisition to aid in neighborhood control, the methods Columbia has used to acquire properties, and the change within the racial composition of both the Morningside Heights and Manhattanville neighborhoods. In a broader sense, this paper will examine the integration of university expansion within the city of New York’s development goals, with specific attention towards the prominent planning practices of each respective time period.

The paper will begin by examining the available literature on the history of Columbia within New York City. Particular emphasis will be placed on how Columbia’s real estate acquisition was influenced by the university’s self-interest, larger interaction with New York City’s development goals, and the various instances of community opposition. This section will
be divided into five sections; Columbia’s beginnings in New York City, Columbia’s initial move uptown, the primary expansionary period, the controversy surrounding the gymnasium proposal, and the major themes within Columbia’s history. The paper will then introduce the details surrounding the Manhattanville expansion from its announcement in 2003 and its final approval in 2009, in order to provide a qualitative analysis of the two expansions.

To provide a quantitative insight into real estate practices, this research required both a record of Columbia’s current landholdings and their acquisition dates. As Columbia does not provide this data publicly, this catalog of acquisition dates was created using New York City property tax lot record data. This data provides the opportunity for comparison regarding the number of buildings acquired, the strategic pattern of acquisition to aid in neighborhood control, and the racial change of the expansion neighborhoods based on Decennial Census data from 1940 through 2010.

The paper will then conclude with the significance of Columbia achieving a “Good neighbor” status in regards to its relationship with both the city of New York and the neighborhoods and communities that surround its campuses. Future opportunities for effective community and university interaction will also be discussed.
History:

I. Columbia’s beginning in New York City

Founded as King’s College by way of royal charter on October 31, 1754, Columbia University is the fifth oldest institution of higher education in the United States and the oldest in New York State. At its inception, the campus was located at Trinity Church on Broadway and Wall Street, with a student body drawn primarily from elite local families. As opposed to institutions which were beginning to instruct on emerging professional fields, Columbia’s curriculum remained scholarly conservative, emphasizing the classics (Dolkhart, 2001).

By the 1850s, the trustees were faced with a need to expand both their academic offerings as well as their colonial-era facilities. At the time, the college owned a large plot of land on the west side of Fifth Avenue between 47th and 51st streets, known as the “Upper Estate,” which served as a logical place to relocate (McCaughey, 2003). The Upper Estate came into Columbia’s possession in 1814, when Columbia had requested financial assistance from the state legislature. The area was previously the site of the Hosack Botanical Garden (McCaughey, 2003). After a proposal to move the campus to rural Westchester county was rejected, the trustees voted to relocate temporarily in the former “Deaf and Dumb Asylum” complex on the block between Madison and Fourth (now Park) avenues and East 49th and 50th street, just east of the Upper Estate. Although Columbia initially only planned to remain in this location while a new campus was built on the Fifth Avenue property, the school would remain at this temporary location for forty years. The trustees chose to warehouse the Upper Estate property, on the assumption that the area surrounding Fifth Avenue would soon develop into a prestigious residential neighborhood. It did, with the mansions and townhouses built on Fifth Avenue generating a substantial income for the college through the use of land leases (Dolkhart, 2001).

Concomitant to Columbia’s move, the trustees broadened the educational curriculum once again, permitting senior students to study science, history, and law. Again, this expansion of programs required an increase in space, although at this time Columbia’s student body was
smaller in comparison than Harvard, Yale, and other elite colleges (Dolkhart, 2001). Expansion on the Madison Avenue site was becoming difficult as Columbia became increasingly surrounded by mansions and rowhouses. Columbia was restricted by this lack of space, and its facilities became increasingly unconducive to learning and advanced study. At a time when graduate and professional educations were becoming increasingly important, Columbia’s lack of programs caused many elite families within New York City to send their children to prestigious schools elsewhere. The trustees understood that if Columbia wanted to remain competitive, the institution needed to undertake substantial changes to both its curriculum and its physical setting (Dolkhart, 2001).

II. Columbia’s Move Uptown

With the death of Colombia's president A.P Barnard in 1889, the trustees selected the college’s first non-academic president, Seth Low, in hopes of facilitating the college’s need for change. Initially concerned with improving Columbia’s academic offerings, in 1891 Low brought his attention to the college’s inadequate facilities and established a committee to investigate potential new locations for the campus. The committee ultimately determined three possible options for the school: a move outside of the city, the fragmentation of the college among different locations within the city, or the purchase of a new site in Manhattan (Dolkhart, 2001).

From the outset, remaining a unified campus within the city limits was the preferable option. Low and several trustees recognized the educational advantages to the school’s location within the city, as well as providing a competitive edge over rival institutions. Fragmentation of the campus was a possibility, but it would be costly and would reduce the amount of interaction among departments. Finding a new site that would allow the college to relocate as a single unit would be ideal yet somewhat difficult, as the school had little funds at its disposal, land costs were high, and much of Manhattan was already developed (Dolkhart, 2001).

In 1891, the New York Hospital’s Bloomingdale Asylum was suggested as potential site for Columbia by John B. Pine, the clerk of the Board of Trustees. Pine compiled a report for his
suggestion which listed the advantages of the site, summarizing: “It is well within the city limits, and in a portion of the city likely to be well built up, and … it retains all of the advantages of a city university which our present site possesses, while infinitely superior in all other aspects” (Dolkhart, 2001). Columbia began secret negotiations with New York Hospital for the northern portion of the hospital’s holdings, four blocks between West 116th and 120th between Amsterdam Avenue and Broadway, which the hospital offered for $2 million (New York Hospital Real Estate Committee, 1981).

This price represented a lot price of $6,525 per lot, which was slightly inflated as the hospital was attempting to finance the construction of a new facility in White Plains (Dolkhart, 2001). Columbia desired the site because the land was undivided by cross streets and had buildings that could be temporarily used by the college, but the property’s high cost was prohibitive. Columbia did not have the funds available, nor had they been successful in the past in raising funds from its graduates or the citizens of New York. Dean John W. Burgess described how in the past, “Columbia had received from individual donors hardly enough as a permanent endowment to pay the salary of a single professor …. While individual residents of New York had given millions to Harvard, Yale, and other institutions.” To gain the necessary support and financial backing for the project, the trustees in favor of the move realized that they had to convince both Alumni and New Yorkers in general the potential for a great university within their city. (Dolkhart, 2001, 111)

Low announced Columbia’s decision to take an option on the Morningside Heights property at an alumni dinner on December 15, 1891. After initial mixed sentiments, city newspapers began publishing editorial comments of approval in the following months. The consensus was generally that in order Columbia to compete with other elite schools, an upgrade in facilities was required, and that this provided an opportunity for New York’s image as well. In what would become a common framing of comparison to other Ivy League schools, The New
York Recorder summarized the views of those who saw the move as assuring a great future for the college:

The proposal of the Faculty of the Columbia College . . . [is] wise and timely . . . While Columbia has for years been an old-fashioned rather conservative school, it has not been accorded the place which should belong to a leading college of the metropolis and one so richly endowed. Harvard and Yale have outstripped it in educational fame. Princeton, Cornell and the University of Virginia are better known. There is no reason why, with a liberal, progressive government, Columbia should not hold the primacy to which it is entitled. A long step towards this would be the building of a college worthy of Columbia. (1981)

Concerns about the new campus were predominantly focused on Columbia’s decision to remain in an urban setting rather than relocating to a more traditional rural environment. The few editorials that were hostile to the plan questioned a site selected on the densely populated Manhattan. The New York Mercury presented the most acute opposition, stating that the $2 million purchase was “a foolish piece of extravagance” as the schools would soon have the same space problems as the 50th street site, and would need to relocate again. The Real Estate Record and Builders Guide also opposed the purchase, although this may have been a result that its constituency of speculative builders would not have the opportunity to develop the hospital’s property (RRBG, 1891, 787). The Evening Post stated that while owners surrounding the new property should be happy with Columbia’s plans, “This sale in bulk will be a great disappointment to many real estate-estate operators, who expected to profit by the gradual increase in values that would have followed a large auction of lots (“The Real Estate Market, 1891, 4).”

Within the context of financing, Columbia’s relocation announcement came shortly after New York University purchased a site for a new campus on Fordham Heights in the Bronx (Jones, 1933). Jacob Schiff, a leader of New York’s German-Jewish community and a major benefactor within the city, suggested that the schools affiliate in some way to aid their fundraising efforts. The logic was that the universities had similar goals and would likely target similar segments of the city’s wealthy population. Although Low ultimately wanted no part in
affiliating with NYU, he could not reject the proposal outright as he still hoped to obtain donations from Schiff and other members of the German-Jewish establishment. As a result, he told Schiff and NYU’s chancellor Henry MacCracken that Columbia would only accept a full consolidation of the universities, and Columbia would not change its name under any circumstances, knowing that these requests would likely prove unacceptable. For more than a year the three communicated, but ultimately nothing came of Schiff’s proposal (Dolkhart, 2001).

Although Low had gained significant support for Columbia’s move among trustees, alumni, and press, he was still unable to procure the funds needed for the purchase of the Morningside Heights property. The alumni remained a poor source of financial support for the university, which was exacerbated by the collapse of the financial market in June 1893. The campaign to raise funds for the land purchase only produced $427,150 total, with alumni donating $136,150 of that amount. $100,000 was a gift from a single alumnus, William C. Schermerhorn (Dolkhart, 2001).

Fundraising efforts for the new campus stopped completely in March 1892 when Columbia needed to focus its intentions on a fighting a bill which would open West 119th Street between Amsterdam Avenue and Broadway, and thus split the Morningside Heights property into two segments. The bill was introduced by state senator George Washington Plunkett, a prominent Tammany politician, and may have represented an act against Low’s anti-Tammany politics. As Columbia could not proceed with the purchase of the Morningside site if the property would be subdivided, Low reached out to the senator. He framed his argument around Plunkett’s concerns for increasing the real estate values in his district, stating that Columbia’s presence in Morningside Heights “would bring to it as a place of residence a large number of professors and students. . . permanently increasing the value of all property in the neighborhood.” (Columbia University Archives, Low to Plunkett, 1892). Simultaneously, the alumni began circulating a petition to Mayor Hugh Grant, eventually signed by over 5,000 people, seeking his support in protecting the property.
On March 7, 1893, the trustees officially voted to purchase the site if guaranteed a bill to keep 17th, 118th, and 119th streets permanently closed (Dolkhart, 2001). Columbia offered to cede a strip of land on the south side of West 120th Street, allowing the city to lay out boulevard one hundred feet wide in order to maintain the Bloomingdale site as one property (“Friendly to Columbia,” 1892). With the support of the Mayor, local real estate interests, and several notable alumni, Plunkett accepted this compromise, and Low’s vision remained feasible.

Low wrote personal letters to some of the city’s wealthiest residents in attempts to generate larger gifts, including William Waldorf Astor, Andrew Carnegie, and Theodore Havemeyer, none of which ultimately gave to the campaign (Dolkhart, 2001). J.P. Morgan and Cornelius Vanderbilt each gave Columbia $100,000, with Williams D. James contributing $50,000. With the donations of a few other wealthy individuals, in 1892 the school was able to complete the purchase of the Morningside Heights property with the sale of the Madison Avenue campus and a $1 million-dollar mortgage (Dolkhart, 2001).

At the outset of designing the new campus, Low hoped that the Columbia’s effort would provide the university with a new identity, as well as symbolize its status as one of the city’s prominent institutions. Low, although sensitive to issues of architectural quality, had no experience or training in designing an institutional complex of this scale (Dolkhart, 2001). As a result, he enlisted the assistance of his friend and trustee George Lockhart Rives. Both agreed that it was critical that the campus design would fit Columbia’s educational needs and serve as an architectural symbol of the school’s importance. With funding limiting new construction to only essential buildings, Low initiated a survey of departmental needs to determine that the new campus buildings would provide sufficient and appropriate space for modern educational demands. With data from the survey providing insight into which buildings needed to be built immediately, which could be constructed later, and which could be placed temporarily within existing asylum structures, Low and the trustees could face the issues of campus planning and building design (Dolkhart, 2001).
After receiving several proposals from prominent architects of the time, in November 1893 Columbia officially hired McKim, Mead & White to design the Morningside Heights campus. McKim’s design utilized the Beaux-Arts style and classical buildings that had defined the World’s Columbian Exposition of the same year. With the final design proposal submitted in October of 1894, by 1895 work on the campus infrastructure was underway. On October 4, 1897, classes met for the first time on the Morningside Heights campus, marking the completion of the first phase of construction and fulfilling Low’s dream of a monumental new urban campus (Bergdoll, 1997).

III. Expansion Period

Aided by the IRT subway line beginning service in 1904, the rural Morningside Heights began to rapidly urbanize. Following Columbia, many other elite institutions began to take advantage of Morningside Heights’ location being both within the city limits, but removed from the congestion of downtown and midtown. Among those who relocated included the Jewish Theological Seminary (1903), Corpus Christi Church (1906), Union Theological Seminary (1910), the Institute of Musical Art (1910), later becoming the Juilliard School of Music, the International House (1924), and the Riverside Church (1930) (Chronopoulos, 2012).

In 1915, as many African Americans began to leave the south for the nation’s Northern cities, Morningside Heights began to shift demographically. In 1930 there were approximately 70,000 people in the Morningside Heights neighborhood, almost all of whom were white. By 1950, following the larger trends New York City post World War II, the Puerto Rican and Black populations grew to 6,552 and 6,671 respectively, while the total population remained roughly the same (Phillips, 1958). Simultaneously, as in many of the country’s major cities, middle class white residents began leaving for suburban communities. Black residents lived primarily in the areas north of 122nd Street, while the Puerto Rican population was primarily concentrated in the area south of 114th Street, where there was the highest concentration of single room occupancy hotels (Phillips, 1958).
The growing prominence of the SRO was indicative of the Great Depression’s impact on the residential landscape of Morningside Heights. Many tenants began taking in boarders as a means of paying their monthly rent, while many larger apartment buildings began to subdivide the apartments. Other building owners converted their buildings into single room occupancy hotels (SROs) by subdividing apartments into small, single-room units with shared bathrooms and kitchens (Dolkhart, 2001). This conversion was well-suited to the time period, as many single men and women moved to New York City for war-related jobs. Additionally, wartime federal rent regulations in place which prevented building owners from substantially raising rents in apartment buildings did not apply to SROs, which incentivized these conversions. They were often done in the cheapest way possible, and grand apartment buildings such as the Hendrick Hudson, Hendrick Hudson Annex, and the Devonshire rapidly deteriorated, gathering numerous buildings, health, and sanitary code violations (Carriere, 2011).

The SROs quickly gained the reputation as housing for prostitutes, drug users, and criminals, and were viewed as a major threat to property and infrastructure investments of the area institutions. Columbia, like many other urban higher education institutions, was worried about its ability to continue to attract students if Morningside Heights was perceived as dangerous and deteriorating. Faced with the West Side’s declining real estate values, Columbia’s institutional approach was decidedly to remain in its historic location and invest in what they believed was the stabilized and renewal of their surrounding neighborhood. Their motivation, however, was decidedly not in assisting the city, but solely in protecting Columbia.

Columbia’s earliest effort to preserve its environment came in 1947, when it joined forces with other thirteen area institutions to form Morningside Heights, Incorporated (Hepner, 1955). The organization described their purpose as being “to promote the improvement of Morningside Heights as an attractive residential, educational, and cultural area” (Collins, n.d.). The institutions were primarily concerned with the idea of the racially charged “encroachment of Harlem” which represented the spread of slum conditions from Harlem and Manhattanville.
The area institutions were afraid that their generally white and middle-class neighborhood residents would grow intimidated by the increasing Black and Puerto Rican populations. Coincidentally, these institutions were also acknowledged to be some of the most progressive in the city, supporting civil rights and integration. When asked if integration was important, Stanley Salmen, then head of University planning answered yes, but in terms of Columbia’s faculty, stated that “I don’t think they need to live in it to understand it” (“The Wider War on Morningside Heights,” 1968).

The first major action of Morningside Heights, Inc., was focused on demolishing low rental housing and replacing it with a middle income cooperative housing complex. Their first project was the replacement of the apartment houses and tenements north of 122nd Street, which were largely made up of Black households. On October 1, 1951, the nine institutions in Morningside Heights that were located the furthest north, including Barnard College, Columbia University, Corpus Christi R.C. Church, International House, Jewish Theological Seminary, The Juilliard School of Music, Riverside Church, Teachers College, and the Union Theological Seminary, announced their sponsorship of Morningside Gardens, a slum clearance project slated to replace the buildings on the two blocks north of 123rd Street between Amsterdam Avenue and Broadway with 984 middle-income cooperative apartments in six twenty-story buildings (Dolkhart, 2001). Although there were many deteriorated buildings within this proposed renewal area, this area was also home to a significant number of six-story elevator buildings from the early 20th century that were very similar to the middle-class apartment buildings between 111th and 114th streets (Dolkhart, 2001). Robert Moses, then in the role of City Construction Coordinator, stated that the project would be built on “honest to goodness slum land” (Hepner, 1955). At the public hearing for the proposal before the New York City Planning Commission held in 1952, Harry Emerson Fosdick, retired minister of Riverside Church testified in favor of the project, stating:
What you are considering today is not just the fate of one housing project, but the possible future of one of the city’s most important neighborhoods. It is a pioneer neighborhood where the American city confronts some of its most characteristic problems and where, if we solve them at all well, the whole world will know it. (Hepner, 1955).

The Morningside Gardens Cooperative project was accompanied by the New York City Housing Authority’s General Grant Houses, which would serve as a low-income housing project to the north and east of Morningside Heights with 1,950 apartments in ten high-rise slabs (Stern, 1955). Between the two of these redevelopment projects, roughly 36,000 individuals would be displaced (Chronopoulos, 2012). The Morningside Heights Housing Corporation, which was the formal sponsor of the project, was designated to assist residents with relocation, offering to pay their moving costs and find them comparable apartments. Residents whose homes were designated for clearance organized a multiracial coalition with the assistance of the American Labor Party called the Save Our Homes Committee with the intention of campaigning specifically against MHI and Columbia. Their opposition tactics included petitioning the Board of Estimate, disrupting the Board of Estimates meetings with hundreds of demonstrators, and winning electoral victories in the local school’s parent’ association and the Manhattanville Neighborhood Center (Chronopoulos, 2012). They presented statistics that demonstrated that they lived in decent housing, which they claimed had been misconstrued by a survey completed by Columbia. While half of the residents who responded to the survey reported that they were satisfied with their housing, MHI administrators and government officials reported only reported only on the half that expressed dissatisfaction. They also pointed out the threat of displacement, as the majority of their incomes would not permit them to buy into the Morningside Gardens development, and even if all units in the new General Grant housing were reserved for them, there would only be room for about half of residents (Chronopoulos, 2012). In response, MHI and Moses branded the leader of the Save Our Homes Coalition, Elizabeth Barker, as a communist. This caused the media to largely dismiss the organization as a fringe-left wing
organization (Chronopoulos, 2012). The resident’s group was unable to stop the projects and by 1957 both complexes were ready for occupancy.

Morningside Gardens was considered an integration success, with the racial makeup of the original stakeholders being approximately 75 percent white, 25 percent black, 4 percent Asian, and 1 percent Puerto Rican (Dolkhart, 2001). One third of these residents were drawn from the staff of the sponsoring organizations. This view of integration success was common for the time, as the *New York Times* noted, “Housing and integration experts believe that the chances of successful integration are best when Negroes and Puerto Ricans together make up no more than 25 percent of tenants” (Grutzner, 1957). The NYCHA developed General Grant houses, were therefore considered less successful, with a population of 51 percent Black, 38 percent Puerto Rican, and 11 percent white (Dolkhart, 2001).

The completion of these two developments represented an important turning point for Morningside Heights, Inc. and its organizations. First, it established the northern barrier that would separate Morningside Heights from “the encroachment of Harlem” to the north. Second, it established the framework that Columbia and the other institutions would take in regards approaching the residents that lived in areas they saw as requiring change. The institutions pursued their goals without consideration of their surrounding communities and were now aware that the city and Robert Moses would help facilitate their desired vision for the area. Following the establishment of the northern border, Columbia then began to focus on buying individual properties within the core Morningside Heights area.

The northern fortification also extended beyond the construction of Morningside Gardens and the General Grant Houses with Columbia’s own construction. In 1964, Columbia completed a twenty-one-story apartment building accompanied by a four-story parking garage for 355 automobiles at the corner of West 125th Street and Riverside Drive for 180 faculty members. In 1967, Columbia completed another twenty-six-story tower that housed offices and one hundred faculty apartments, with the addition of an enclosed passageway between the two buildings.
None of the buildings had entrances that faced West 125th Street, further supporting the fact that Columbia had no interest in interacting with the city above that point (Chronopoulos, 2012).

President Butler had long been interested in increased property holdings for the University, stating to the trustees in 1925, “the need of taking early steps to protect the University site and to make possible its future development and expansion as conditions might from time to time make desirable or necessary” (CUA, 1925). Butler began this campaign in 1903 with the purchase of South Field and continued with the university’s purchase of the block between West 116th and 117th streets east of the main campus between 1910 and 1914. Columbia purchased its first apartment houses in 1919, but only began to acquire large numbers of residential buildings in the 1950s.

According to Roger Kahn’s account in “The Battle for Morningside Heights: Why Students Rebel,” by 1934, Columbia had acquired only twenty-seven off campus buildings (1970). Between 1955 and 1959 the university acquired eighteen new buildings, fifty-three between 1960 and 1964, and sixty-two more in the years before the strike in 1968. Estimates state that the 108 buildings purchased between 1940 and 1966 came at a cost of $23 million. On the whole of the period, estimates indicate more than 150 buildings were acquired and 7,500 people displaced (Kahn, 1970). Throughout the available literature, these are the most specific numbers on building acquisition available, and their verification provided the major impetus of this research.

Although Columbia was purchasing the largest number of buildings over the largest geographic area, other area institutions such as Barnard College, Union Theological Seminary, Jewish Theological Seminary, and St. Luke’s Hospital were similarly acquiring properties (Dolkhart, 2001). Barnard demolished the six-story Bryn Mawr hotel on Amsterdam and West 121st Street create the Plimpton dormitory, St. Luke’s Hospital removed eight buildings on Riverside Drive north of 122nd Street to create Van Dusen Hall (now International House
North), and the Jewish Theological Seminary demolished two apartment buildings for its library addition (Dolkhart, 2001).

The acquisition of apartment buildings by institutions began to create tensions within the residential community of Morningside Heights. Because the neighborhoods’ SROs were not typically covered under rent regulations, these were often the first buildings cleared to be either demolished or converted to apartments. According to the 1967 Morningside Heights Core Area Study, at least nine SROs were torn down during the 1960s, and of the thirty-three SROs in existence in 1961, only two were still in use in 1997 (Dolkhart, 2001). SRO removal tied not only into Columbia’s interests, but also into the city’s ideology that specific spatial arrangements were best for reducing social disorganization.

After acquisition, Columbia’s moved quickly to remove existing SRO residents, typically through either harassment or building neglect. For example, after being acquired by Columbia in 1966, the Conhar Hall SRO at 609 West 115th Street had sixty-three buildings department violations. The building was lacking heat, hot water, and a working elevator, and many doors had no locks. Within a few months, Conhar Hall was ready for demolition, as all tenants had left (Kahn, 1970). In addition to neglect, residents were also harassed with lock plippings and increased security within their buildings. If this failed, rent checks were simply refused and eviction proceedings would begin.

The fact that most of the evicted residents were Black and Puerto Rican heightened racial tensions within the area. In 1961, charges that Columbia was attempting “to drive Negroes and Puerto Ricans from the Morningside Heights area” were filed with the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, following attempts to remove tenants from the Devonshire at West 112th Street (Arnold, 1961). Following the conversion of the building to a hotel in 1952, Columbia and several other Morningside Heights institutions had invested $1.5 million dollars to assist the owner of the Devonshire so that units could be rented to affiliates of the institutions (Arnold, 1961a). Columbia claimed its actions were not discriminatory, and that
the university was interested in creating more decent housing for the neighborhood and that none of the educational institutions discriminated the acceptance of students. The State Commission reported in 1962, the same year the University officially took ownership of the building, that while the new residents were “predominantly white,” non-white students, teachers, and staff members were equally entitled to housing, so no discrimination on the part of the University was found (“Housing Bias Case Won by Columbia,” 1962).

The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), however, vowed to protest Columbia’s segregated housing policies. In 1964, the city’s Commission on Human Rights announced an inquiry into a complaint “that the university was singling out Negroes and Puerto Ricans for eviction.” (Columbia, N.Y.U. Face Racial Fight,” 1962)

Columbia also acquired several apartment buildings during this time. Because these buildings were under the purview of New York City’s strict rent regulations, those with legitimate leases could not be evicted. Beginning in 1962, however, Columbia began to require all new tenants within their buildings to sign an affiliation clause that permitted the university to terminate their tenancy when they left Columbia. Tenant and community groups fought this rule, taking Columbia to court, but State courts ruled in Columbia’s favor (Dolkhart, 2001).

Columbia’s building acquisitions were not solely used for housing affiliates. Some apartment buildings purchased were converted for nonresidential academic uses. The Ostend Apartments, which was the Oxford Residence Hotel before it was acquired by Columbia in 1965, was converted into the Goddard Institute of Space Studies and renamed Armstrong Hall. Victor Hall at 622 West 113th Street, purchased by Columbia in 1965, was renamed McVickar Hall and converted into classrooms for the School of International Affairs and then for the school of Social Work (“Rename 6 Buildings to Honor CU Men,” 1966).

Some buildings were also demolished for institutional expansion. Announced in 1956, the East Campus Expansion project was celebrated as a collaborative effort between the city and the university by both Mayor Robert Wagner and Robert Moses (Collins, n.d.). The
“superblock” style development was a move to expand the campus east of Amsterdam Avenue from 116 to 118th streets. Moses praised the project particularly for its potential for slum clearance. Despite significant community opposition, Columbia proceeded to tear down sixteen row houses and five apartment buildings, displacing hundreds of families. The site was then occupied by the School of International Affairs, the School of Law, and an undergraduate residence hall (Collins, n.d.).

Another expansion effort came in 1962 with the relocation of the School of Pharmacy from midtown Manhattan to West 121st Street. To construct the new school, tenants from six buildings were evicted. However, Marie Runyon, a tenant spokesperson and later assemblywoman, successfully fought against the construction of the new university buildings in their place. By 1971, plans were created to construct a joint community and university housing project which would contain both low and middle-income housing, but this was never realized. The College of Pharmacy went bankrupt, and the site remains vacant to date (Collins, n.d.).

Beyond the institutional scale, the city of New York also played a role in altering Morningside Heights, although these efforts were largely in line with Columbia’s vision for the area. In 1961, the Morningside Renewal Council (MRC) was established by the City of New York Housing and Redevelopment Board to represent the needs and interests of the area. The MRC recommended sites for renewal projects, which were then reviewed by city agencies, who if accepted, then acquired the property from the landlord for demolition. In 1963, the MRC sought the rehabilitation of Morningside Park through the construction of a Columbia-owned gymnasium, which would later become the most inflammatory event between Columbia and the Morningside Heights community (Collins, n.d.).

In 1964, the Housing and Redevelopment Board also developed the Morningside General Neighborhood Renewal Plan (GNRP), a ten-year plan for the renewal of a 92-block section of the Upper West Side surrounding Columbia (O’Kane, 1964). The document stated that the elimination of rooming houses will be “a major activity,” and that the city’s powers of
condemnation, tax abatement and loan mortgage programs will be used either to forced owners to convert SROs or enable the city to take possession and demolish them (O'Kane, 1964). Most notable of the plan, and effectively demonstrating the city’s support of Columbia’s efforts in altering Morningside Heights, was the exclusion of the blocks adjoining Columbia in the center of the renewal area. This effectively allowed no provisions to be made for the existing tenants within this area (Collins, n.d.).

After significant community protest in regard to this proposal, as well as turnover that left Columbia with fewer alliances in City Hall, Manhattan Borough President Constance Baker Motley called the alliance between urban redevelopment and Columbia’s expansion into question. In April 1965, the plan was revised to freeze all renewal plans except for those which had already been announced. The day before the Board of Estimate met to vote on this plan, Columbia announced eleven new projects, bringing its total number of new projects announced since 1962 to twenty (Bergdoll, 1997).

In summation, a letter from Butler in retirement in 1945, he expresses his intentions very clearly, summarizing both Columbia’s intentions for acquisition and the fears of failing to do so.

It has always been my ambition to have the University own all the property between 114th and 122nd Streets, Amsterdam Avenue and Morningside Drive, in order that it might be made part of the campus for development for years to come. In this way we should unify Morningside and lay the bases for the solution of the difficult problems which will confront our successors, but we should also protect ourselves against invasion from Harlem or from the North. Morningside Park is, so far as it goes, a helpful protection, but the pressure upon Harlem is very great and at any time we might find an apartment house on Morningside Heights has been purchased to be occupied by Harlem tenants. The investment of the University funds in these buildings, would, in my judgement, be excellent and would produce a somewhat larger income than those which come from ordinary investments in securities. Moreover, by owning the title of this property, ... we should achieve that unity of Morningside Heights which I have had in mind for a half century (Letter from Butler to Black, CUA, 1945)

IV: The Park Protests and Community Mobilization

Columbia’s gymnasium facilities were built in 1896 and had been deemed inadequate only two decades after opening (Collins, n.d.). Previously, Columbia had a successful
experience with developing parkland for the benefit of both Columbia students and community members with the establishment of the Columbia University-Community Athletic Field at the southeast end of Morningside Park during the 1950s (Carriere, 2011). By the 1960s, Columbia was faced with a more pressing need for more recreational space for their growing student population, and with their previous success in mind, signed an agreement in 1961 with the city of New York to build a Columbia/community gymnasium in the public Morningside Park (Carriere, 2011). It is not clear whether or not the initial idea of constructing a gym within Morningside Heights Park came from Columbia, or then Parks Commissioner Robert Moses (Collins, n.d.). The lease permitted Columbia to use 2.1 acres of land of the parks existing 30 acres for the facility, and in return would pay $3,000 a year to the city and allow the community use of the facility (Collins, n.d.).

Columbia’s intention of developing the park property may have represented contrasting intentions. On one hand, faced with increased community tensions, the University may have been making a genuine effort for the residents of the surrounding area. James Young, Director of Community Activities at the Columbia Community Athletic Field, noted that the project would be open to all members of the community, and that through the facility, “many boys will be encouraged to develop healthy bodies, learn the meaning of fair play and develop tolerance of racial difference” (“The Columbia and Community Gymnasiums: A Background,” 1968). As community opposition towards displacement was rising, Columbia also emphasized that the project would not require any demolition of housing.

The project may have also represented efforts in line with the intentions of Columbia’s SRO removal, namely the reduction of blight and urban disorder, as well as an opportunity for Columbia to gain increased control over its built environment. Both approaches were revealed in Columbia’s marketing of the plan to the community:

By using the park site instead of a city block, University officials note, no residents of the community are being displaced. At the same time, it is expected that the existence of a much-used facility like the gymnasiums will help make Morningside Park considerably
safer. The park has long been a dangerous area with more than its share of broken bottles and benches, crumbling cement stairs, and crime (“The Columbia and Community Gymnasiums: A Background,” 1968)

The legality of constructing a private facility on public land required additional effort by Columbia and the city. As New York Courts held that municipalities were not able to lease park property to others without approval of state legislature, a formal request by the Mayor needed to be made, and then concurred by the City Council. Because the New York State Constitution prohibited a city from aiding any private corporation without adequate consideration, independent appraisals were conducted to determine if Columbia could build within Morningside Park. The appraisals found that Columbia’s proposed plans were fully legal. However, all of these discussions were highly secretive and did not involve feedback from the surrounding community (“The Columbia and Community Gymnasiums: A Background,” 1968). When the park’s lease was finalized in 1961, however, the project had the support of several Harlem and Morningside Heights organizations who found the project to be a substantial effort on Columbia’s part towards community involvement. In October 1962, The Morningside Citizen viewed the park as a positive development for the neighborhood, stating it was “impressed with the willing and effective cooperation of the police and University in solving this community problem” in regards to improving lighting at one of the gym’s entrances (“New Gym Access, 1962).

From the time following the completion of the lease in 1961 to 1965, Columbia focused on fundraising for the project, which had grown to a cost of $11.6 million dollars (Carriere, 2011). The plans for the structure included four levels of facilities, constructed within the natural topography of the park. The design, however, allowed for no contact between community members and Columbia students, as Columbia students would enter at the top of the bluff while community residents would enter from the bottom entrance (Carriere, 2011).

As details of the gym’s design emerged, community organizations began to critique the project. Columbia CORE voiced their opposition to the gym in February 1966, stating that the
design “endorsed a brand of university-community segregation and that the school had no business taking public land for private use” (Carriere, 2011). A month later, Columbia University’s Student Council urged the school to suspend its construction efforts, stating that there was a lack of transparency within the decision-making project in that community groups and members were not adequately consulted (Carriere, 2011). Also in March, a group of local residents organized against the gym under the name the Ad Hoc Committee for Morningside Park called for the “complete cancellation” of the city’s agreement to allow Columbia to build on city-owned property. In April, the Parks Commissioner at the time, Thomas P.F. Hoving led a rally against the park, in which he placed a wreath before a headstone to mark the “death” of the public park. Speakers at the event addressed their outrage at Columbia taking public park land, the community’s proposed usage of the facility, and Columbia’s overall role in the redevelopment of Morningside Heights (Carriere, 2011).

Despite growing community opposition, on February 19, 1968, Columbia began clearing the site for the gymnasium. Two days later, on February 21, 1968 the West Harlem Morningside Park Committee, a successor of the Ad Hoc Committee for Morningside Park Committee, organized a twenty-five-person demonstration to call for the construction to stop. During this effort, twelve individuals were arrested for disorderly conduct. On February 28, 1968, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Graduate Student Council, and the College Citizenship Council organized a protest of 150 people against the gym. During the demonstration, a number of individuals tore down a section of fencing surrounding the construction site, attempted to stop a truck from entering the site, and sat in front of a bulldozer. Thirteen people were arrested, including twelve Columbia students (Carriere, 2011).

Objection to the gym was made up of a unique combination of not only community organizations and residents of the neighborhood, but also staff and students of the university. A seventy-member Faculty Civil Rights Group urged for “cooperation with community representatives in the planning and operation of all programs,” as well as an overall reduction of
Columbia’s expansion efforts. In March of 1968 the faculty of the School of Architecture also asked President Kirk and trustees to reconsider the project (Carriere, 2011).

On April 20, 1968 the Harlem chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) organized a rally in Harlem, representing several black organizations within New York City, such as the Harlem Committee for Self-Defense, the United Black Front, and the New York chapter of the SNCC. Additional community groups such as the West Harlem Community Organization and other tenant groups were also in attendance. The rally again focused on Columbia’s failure in community participation efforts and the overall institutional expansion of Columbia within Morningside Heights (Collins, n.d.).

The most pivotal demonstration against the gym came on April 23, 1968, in which protests led by student groups such as Students Afro-American Society (SAS) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) called for a strike against the University. The effort was led by SDS chapter chairman Mark Rudd, who had additional objections with the University’s involvement with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and in extension, the Vietnam War.

Columbia was one of twelve corporate members of IDA, a non-profit think tank that employed academics in studying the effectiveness of new weapons through the Pentagon’s Systems Evaluation Group. Tension towards Columbia’s efforts that appeared to support the Vietnam war were growing campus-wide, and on March 27, 1968 a campus demonstration against Columbia’s activities with the IDA led to six students receiving disciplinary charges (Collins, n.d.). The April 23rd demonstration called for not only construction of the park to cease, but the charges for these students to be rescinded and Columbia’s involvement with the IDA to end. After the call for the strike, approximately 200 students tore down sections of fence surrounding the construction site and fought with police. The students then entered Hamilton Hall and took acting dean Henry Coleman as a hostage. Students also barricaded themselves in the offices of President Kirk and Vice President David Truman. On April 25, architecture students took over the School of Architecture in Avery Hall and drew up a resolution that called
for the university to adopt an “expansionary policy that does not overrun adjacent areas” as well as a “university effort to recruit more Black and Puerto Rican students and greater university recognition of students and community groups in formulating university policy.” By the end of the day, a total of five Columbia buildings were occupied by approximately 1,000 students. On April 26, the administration announced the gymnasium construction would be suspended, but did not accept the demand for amnesty for the disciplined students. On Tuesday, April 30th, President Kirk authorized 1,000 police to forcibly remove students from the five buildings, resulting in nearly seven hundred students being arrested, and the hospitalization of several other students, faculty, and members of the press (Collins, n.d.).

Participants of the strike saw Columbia’s approach in regards to the gym as an effort to reclaim and reorder the broader Morningside Heights community, consistent with the actions they had taken with the area’s SROs. The language of “social disorganization” and “urban decay” used in association with the park further supported this connection. The presence of the gym within the park represented yet another effort of the university to reinforce the borders of the campus from the surrounding area. The controversy surrounding the gym was focused primarily on the ideas of institutional encroachment of the Morningside Heights area, as well as the denial of the right of neighborhood residents to participate in the planning processes that influenced their environment. Specific objections to the gym included that the community would only have access to 15% of the gym’s facilities, the main door to the gym on Morningside Drive would be for University use while the neighborhood residents would use the backdoor on Morningside Avenue, and that they gym would be controlled and staffed by Columbia (Collins, n.d.). These details reinforced community opposition and prompted the project’s nickname of “Gym Crow.” The park protests ultimately represented a rare victory for the community against Columbia.

The events surrounding the gymnasium construction in 1968 provided a turning point for the University’s practices towards institutional expansion, as well as the interrelation between
the community and the university. In November 1968 Columbia announced I.M. Pei and Partners as the new master planners for the University, representing the university’s first long-term planner in more than 70 years. In announcing the appointment, acting president Andrew W. Cordler stated that he hoped that dislocation of residents that had characterized Columbia’s expansion efforts would end and that “We want to live together as good neighbors” (Fox, 1968). The firm was to work with a 12-member policy review committee that would represent the student body, faculty, and administrators and trustees, with final decision-making powers lying with the board of trustees (Collins, n.d.). Additionally, Morningside Heights saw an increase in community organizing efforts designed to counter Columbia’s influence within the community.

V. Major Historical Themes

Examining Columbia’s extensive history within New York City reveals several major themes regarding the university’s real estate acquisition practices, as well as how the university balances both its internal interests with that of New York City and its surrounding community.

Beginning with Columbia’s earliest relocation efforts, the institution placed importance on remaining within the New York City limits, noting the learning potential of studying within a well-established city. In both Columbia’s initial move uptown and its subsequent move to Morningside Heights, the school leveraged claims of the need for more space with comparisons to other Ivy League schools, despite the fact that these schools were not located within comparable urban cores. Early on, Columbia positioned itself as limited in its ability to compromise on its own institutional interests, perhaps recognizing its economic and social leverage within the city of New York.

Columbia’s real estate acquisition efforts are also characterized by their investment purpose rather than solely institutional use. In being classified as a nonprofit institution, many of Columbia’s property holdings are tax exempt, despite the institution private for-profit real estate developer. Today, many of Columbia’s properties are tax exempt because of this nonprofit status. This idea is exemplified by the portion of Butler’s letter to trustees, stating that “The
investment of the University funds in these buildings, would, in my judgement, be excellent and would produce a somewhat larger income than those which come from ordinary investments in securities” (Letter from Butler to Black, CUA, 1945). Within the competitive real estate environment of New York, Columbia’s endowment benefited significantly increased because of these property holdings.

During the major expansion period from 1950s to 1968, the university was undoubtedly assisted by the property acquisition model established by Morningside Heights, Inc. which acted as a “clearinghouse” for all real estate purchases and transactions for the sponsoring institutions. This process was made even more efficient by the real estate arm of MHI, Remedco, which was founded in 1949. Remedco was operated by a small executive committee made up experienced real estate professionals, who acted quickly on potential real estate acquisitions through close contact with the Morningside Heights, Inc. Board. Several of the SROs acquired by Columbia and other area institutions were often first acquired and cleared of tenants by Remedco before being transferred in title (Morningside Heights Area Alliance Records 1947-1992, CUA, n.d.). Based on parcel acquisition patterns, Columbia appeared to purchase buildings in a very targeted fashion, often acquiring buildings one by one until an entire block was university-owned. Columbia’s real estate savviness not only shaped Morningside Heights to the university’s desires, but also had an immense impact on the school’s finances. In 1970, following the peak of Columbia’s expansionary period, Columbia was the second largest private landowner in the city, second to only the Roman Catholic Church (Kahn, 1970). This placed Columbia’s off campus real estate holdings at a value of roughly $70 million, with mortgages totaling roughly $80 million. According to published figures in 1967, Columbia’s assets totaled $425 million, with $280 coming from the university’s land, buildings, and mortgages (Kahn, 1970). This commitment to real estate has only served to benefit Columbia further as Manhattan’s real estate values have appreciated over time.
In regards to the interaction between University and City, Columbia’s expansion relied heavily on the city of New York. From the initial move to Morningside Heights, the city government was involved heavily in ensuring that the former Bloomingdale Asylum property remained one lot, which was ultimately one of the most critical developments of the campus relocation. Within the context of urban renewal planning that was prominent throughout many American cities during the period of Columbia’s expansion, Robert Moses and his superblock solution ideology ultimately proved critical to Columbia’s expansion efforts. In using Title I money from the Federal Housing Act of 1949 to further the direction of the New York he imagined, Moses and Columbia were able to redevelop their surroundings into an environment they deemed appropriate for an elite institution of higher education. In order for these funds to be used in a targeted area, they required approval under the Mayor’s Committee on Slum Clearance, as headed by Moses. The design, demolition, and construction for these projects was completed by the Morningside Housing Corporation, but the alliance with Columbia’s interests was made obvious by Remedco assisting in the financing and public relations of the projects (Morningside Heights Area Alliance Records 1947-1992, CUA, n.d.).

Again in 1960, when the city received funding from the Housing and Home Finance Agency to create a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan, the city formed a council through the City Housing and Redevelopment Board which was composed of different institutional residents which had a stake in the project. This group was primarily made up of the institutions of Morningside Heights Inc., with Columbia having a major influence (Morningside Heights Area Alliance Records 1947-1992, CUA, n.d.). The city’s use of federal funds ultimately represented a unique public-private partnership that enabled the remaking of Morningside Heights to both the preferences of Robert Moses and the area’s institutions.

Regarding Columbia’s historical relationship with the surrounding community and residents of Morningside Heights, the university has consistently positioned the community as an inconvenient other in relation to the university’s image, interests, and growth. This is most
evident throughout the expansionary period, where the displacement of residents was not only unaddressed, but formally facilitated by the university. Columbia’s strategy of interaction with its surroundings was primarily an act of fortressing the campus from outside influence, attempting to utilize property acquisition as a form of neighborhood control, and quelling community and student organizing in response to their actions. In addition to the university’s actions often being in opposition to the surrounding community, they were also often decided upon within institutional isolation, demonstrating an immense lack of transparency.
Manhattanville Expansion:

Following the events of 1968, Columbia greatly reduced its real estate acquisition practices within Morningside Heights. When the university announced its Manhattanville project in 2003, it was the first effort since the gymnasium controversy that the university had attempted to expand outside of its Morningside Heights area. Additionally, it was the first effort to establish a new campus since initially moving to Morningside Heights in 1896 (Paul, 2010). Given their troubled history with the community, shortly after announcing the expansion the university promised the project would involve a collaborative partnership with the Harlem community. When the details of the plan emerged, including the demolition of 17 acres and the construction of a $6.38 billion state of the art research campus, the Harlem community immediately emerged in opposition to the plan (Paul, 2010).

Columbia’s 197-c plan for the project was completed in 2005 and designed by the university with architects Renzo Piano and Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill (Paul, 2010). Section 197-c of the New York City charter states that “applications by any person or agency respecting the use, development, or improvement of real property subject to city regulation shall be reviewed pursuant to a uniform review procedure.” The formal public review process required by the City Planning Commission, or “ULURP” became required in 1976 (“Step 3: Preparation of Applications - Section 197-c.,” n.d.). The ULURP process reflected the trends of the 1950s and 60s towards the increasing involvement of the city’s Community Boards, as well as a push for increased public participation within the city planning process. The Community Boards originated in 1951 with Mayor Wagner, which served as the city’s first participatory vehicles for neighborhood groups (“Step 3: Preparation of Applications - Section 197-c.,” n.d.).

In addition to the 17 acres above ground, the project involves the construction of a 2 million square foot basement that spans the entire site (“Welcome to Empire State Development,” 2016). Construction is estimated to consist of different phases over the course of 25 years, eventually totaling 5 to 6 million additional square feet of University Space.
Reminiscent of Columbia’s earlier expansions, the university states that the project is necessary to compete with other top universities, stating that at the time, Columbia was operating with half the space of Harvard and a third of the space of Princeton and Yale (Schwartz, 2005).

Community Board 9 (CB 9), which covers the Manhattanville area, was already working on a 197-a plan when the Manhattanville expansion was announced. 197-a plans, institutionalized in 1989, are a non-mandatory community-based plan that offers the potential to facilitate increased public participation within the community planning process (Widman, 2002). When Columbia’s plan was revealed, CB 9 focused its plan on developing solutions for Columbia to expand “while preserving the district’s physical and demographic character without displacement of existing residents” (Community Board 9, 2007). Community Board 9’s process also involved dozens of public meetings throughout the planning process.

Community Board 9’s plan differed from Columbia’s in several ways. First, they wanted Columbia to commit to avoiding the use of eminent domain and allow the expansion site to continue to develop through mixed ownership. Additionally, CB 9 wanted additional environmental analysis for the below-grade development. CB 9 also wanted to retain the industrial capabilities of the area, where Columbia proposed a mixed-use district of retail, commercial, and academic uses. CB 9 also sought mandatory development requirements that would ensure retention or creation of affordable and inclusionary housing practices.

The City Planning Commission considered both plans at the same time. Before review, Columbia added an addendum of community benefits to their plan, which would later be included in the approved Community Benefits Agreement. The benefits include $30 million for a university-run public school, $20 million of in-kind services, a $24 million affordable housing fund, $4 million for legal services, and $76 million for undetermined community use (Hirokawa, 2010).

In 2007, the Commission approved a majority of Columbia’s plan, with the exception of reducing some of the plan’s height limits, the replacement of two research buildings with
university housing, and the establishment of a light manufacturing zone against the river.

Community Board 9’s plan was not approved, with the Planning Commission stating that the plan “did not set forth a comprehensive plan that would integrate Columbia’s long-term growth into the urban fabric in a manner consistent with city objectives” (Bagli, 2007).

In greater detail, the Commission stated:

The Commission recognizes that Columbia is an institution of major importance to the City . . . that attracts intellectual, technical, and scientific capital from around the world. The Columbia plan, as modified by the Commission, allows Columbia to address its space shortages and to provide the kind of research, academic, and teaching facilities that are needed to respond to a changing and dynamic world. With this plan, the City will exercise a critical opportunity to address Columbia’s long-term growth in a manner that is in the best interests of the City, and that will provide for new investment, jobs, and open space and other amenities for the Manhattanville neighborhood of West Harlem (City Planning Commission, 2007). In their decision, the planning commission made it clear that the global reputation and economic impacts of Columbia as an institution heavily influenced their decision. The major concerns of the 197-a plan, including displacement, residential and industrial gentrification, historic preservation, and environmental planning, were not addressed (Hirokawa, 2010).

The CB 9 plan emphasized the existing context of Manhattanville as a traditionally industrial area surrounded by low-income residents. The 197-a’s primary goal, was thus to allow growth “in a manner that promotes a diversity of incomes without displacement of existing residents” (Community Board 9, 2007). The plan was also particularly concerned with the retention of industrial jobs, which pay considerably more than the service industry and made up 15% of local employment in the area. Community Board 9 stated that these jobs were growing before Columbia began to discourage all forms of outside investment with their demolition plans in 2003, and the warehousing of property that may have preceded it (Community Board 9, 2007).

In support of Community Board’s argument for inclusionary housing, they state that 90% of households in the district are renters, with 41% already at a rent-burdened status (Community Board 9, 2007). Columbia’s impact on the area’s housing landscape quickly became evident
with the 3333 Broadway housing complex, a building containing over 1,000 apartments, opting out of the Mitchell-Lama affordable housing program in 2005, leading to a dramatic increase in rents. The community was also concerned with the direct displacement of the project, which was estimated to affect less than 300 people living in the project footprint (Hirokawa, 2010).

Despite warehousing property within the project area for nearly a decade, Columbia was not initially able to purchase all of the properties within the project area. From the outset of the process, Columbia stated it would not seek the use of eminent domains to acquire residential properties (Lombardi, 2007). There were, however, a number of private property owners who refused to sell. For these remaining properties the New York State Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), New York state’s economic development body, utilized eminent domain on behalf of the Columbia expansion project. The public use factors of the project were stated as economic development and blight remediation (Lombardi, 2007).

Following the approval of ESDC’s eminent domain in 2008, two petitions were filed by commercial property owners with businesses within the project footprint in 2009, challenging these determinations (Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 2009). In December 2009, the plaintiffs won a 3-2 decision against ESDC in the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court (Tuck-it-Away et al vs. New York State Urban Development Corporation, 2009). The decision decided against the use of eminent domain on the basis that Columbia’s plan was not a “civic project” in the public interest, and that a biased study was used to deem the area’s blight.

In June of 2010, the Court of Appeals overturned this ruling, stating that the courts must honor the state’s determination that the area was blighted, and that condemnation on behalf of a university served a public purpose, the two conditions required by the law (Bagli, 2010). The ruling cited the decision in a eminent domain case of the previous year, involving the Atlantic Yard development in Brooklyn, where eminent domain was being utilized to condemn roughly 6,000 apartments in order to construct the Atlantic Yards/Barclay Center development. Judge
Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick stated, “We ruled for Atlantic Yards, and if we could rule in favor of a basketball arena, surely we could rule for a nonprofit university” (Bagli, 2010).

The necessity of using eminent domain implies a rather obvious lack of community support. Summarizing the community opposition to the idea of Columbia being the sole landowner within the area, Ron Shiffman, a planner who was involved in the 197-a process stated, “We want Columbia to move into the community, not onto the community. . . We want mixed use and mixed ownership. Otherwise it will end up being a monolithic, homogenized, boring part of the city (Lopez, 2007).

Columbia’s major attempt to respond to community interests came in the form of the community benefits agreement. Although CBAs are typically organized by grassroots organizations, CB 9 formed a local development corporation (LDC) to bargain with Columbia (Vielkind, 2006). This may have resulted from fragmentation within local community groups, and the lack of an existing community organization. The LDC’s process was not ultimately participatory, holding few public meetings and operating overall with a low level of transparency. When the CBA was finalized in May of 2009, it was not supported by CB 9, and in fact voted for its members on the LDC to reject it (Astor, 2009).

There are several criticisms of the CBA that contradict Columbia’s touting of its success. While a CBA can often be indicative of community sentiment towards a proposal, the LDC structure and a lack of community involvement caused the process with Columbia to be somewhat limited. Community leaders contend that the agreement also does not include enough funding for affordable housing and anti-displacement measures, and does not include enough upfront benefits (Hirokawa, 2010). Members of CB 9 were also concerned about the $76 million of the total available $150 million being “unencumbered,” or able to be allocated in any manner by the LDC (Astor, 2009). Other local organizers, particularly members of the Coalition to Preserve Community, a group that outright disapproves Columbia’s expansion into Manhattanville, emphasized the timing of the corporation’s vote was unfair, as it was the day
after the CB 9 executive committee vote, which left no time for community consultation (Astor, 2009).

Additionally, while Columbia has emphasized the generosity of the agreement, the $96 million dollars in community funding only represents 1.5% of the $6.28 billion-dollar cost of the expansion project. CB 9 cited the 2001 CBA agreement of the Staples Center project in Los Angeles, where $75 million was allocated in a development that cost roughly $1 billion dollars, or 7.5% (Community Board 9, 2007).
**Tax Lot Analysis:**

In order to provide a quantitative insight into Columbia’s real estate acquisition practices, a tax lot level map of Columbia’s property holdings was created with data from New York City’s MapPLUTO, a dataset with the city’s tax lot data merged with the Department of Finance Digital Tax Map. The dataset provides extensive land use and geographic data at the tax lot level in ESRI ArcGIS shape format. The intention of this analysis was to examine both Columbia’s historical property acquisitions, and the acquisitions for the Manhattanville expansion, primarily through the number of lots acquired, the spatial strategy of Columbia to reform or reconstruct neighborhood boundaries, and the demographic change of the census tracts surrounding these parcels. The analysis was focused on the Morningside and Manhattanville neighborhood tabulation area levels.

The initial step of analysis was determining which properties Columbia owns within the city. While Columbia provides the names and addresses of campus buildings, there is no public record of the university’s complete property holdings. By querying the PLUTO database, Columbia appears to be the owner of 231 tax lots within the city. A difficulty within determining the correct number of properties was created by disparities within the Owner Name field within the PLUTO database. Overall, there were eighteen different names which signified Columbia ownership. Figure 1 depicts the location of these lots, located primarily within the campus core in Morningside Heights, the Manhattanville neighborhood just above, and the lots associated with the medical campus in Washington Heights.
Figure 1. Tax Lots Owned by Columbia, 2018

Source: NYC PLUTO, January 2018 (17v1.1)
The PLUTO database also contains information on the tax status of the property through the type of ownership code. This data is provided by the New York City Department of City Planning and is based on data from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services and the Department of Finance. The X Code indicates that a property is fully tax exempt that may be owned by the city, state, of federal government, a public authority, or a private institution (PLUTO Technical Documentation, 2018). Of the 231 Columbia owned properties, 62 addresses, or 27 percent of Colombia's total property holdings are tax exempt.

The next step of analysis was to determine the acquisition of the lots within Columbia’s holdings to determine if they were consistent with the literature’s indication of the major expansion period. Using the unique Borough Block Lot identifier (BBL), each lot was searched within New York City’s Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) which provides searchable property records for Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn from 1966 to the present. For records that were returned on ACRIS, the year in which the property was sold or acquired by Columbia was determined by consulting the deed of the transaction. For those transactions prior to 1966, the archived property records were consulted at the Manhattan Borough County Register at 66 John Street in Manhattan. After consulting the records for all properties, the acquisition dates for twelve properties were unable to be determined. The distribution for the remaining 219 properties are depicted below in Figure 2.
As Figure 2 indicates, Columbia saw an initial increase in property acquisition in 1956, with eight lots. The greatest increases followed in the years from 1964 through 1968, in which university acquired 67 lots during the four-year period. This is consistent with the literature’s identification of Columbia’s major property acquisition period taking place during this time, which eventually lead to the increasing community tensions which culminated in the gym protests of 1968. The data is also representative of the shift in acquisition practices facilitated by the events of 1968, with only six lots acquired in 1969, three in 1970, three in 1971, zero in 1972, and three in 1973. Despite a small increase in 1978 with five lots acquired, Columbia overall saw a much slower rate of acquisition during this time period.

Examining the spatial distribution of these lots provides insight into how Columbia desired to interact with its surrounding neighborhood. As Bergdoll (2007) states: as early as 1907 Columbia began to construct a perimeter of buildings enclosing the central library and courtyard area, which would come to characterize the attitude the university’s development for the next century, causing Columbia to become a university decidedly in, rather of, the city of
New York (Bergdoll, 1997). To examine this phenomenon in relation to the demographic change of upper Manhattan, an area of seven neighborhoods was examined (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Upper Manhattan Neighborhoods of Analysis

Source: NYC Open Data, Neighborhood Tabulation Areas
As of 1940, Columbia owned sixteen tax lots within New York City, all located within Morningside Heights. Within upper Manhattan's environment of stark segregation, Columbia was concerned by the potential influx of both African Americans and Puerto Ricans into the Morningside Heights neighborhood. Figure 3 demonstrates the racial distribution through dot density within upper Manhattan in 1940, as well as Columbia's landholdings at that time. With each dot representing 25 individuals, the distribution of the white population in comparison to individuals of all other races is clearly delineated by neighborhood. At this time the Morningside Heights' white population was 125,409 individuals, or 71% of the total population, indicated by green dots. This placed it second only to the Washington Heights neighborhood in terms of highest white percentage, which had 90%. To the east and north, the non white populations were noticeably higher. Manhattanville, directly above Morningside Heights had a non white percentage of 36%, while Harlem South and North had populations 54% and 60%, respectively (Table 1).

Table 1. Racial Composition of Upper Manhattan Neighborhoods, 1940

<table>
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<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Lot Count</th>
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<td>314,616</td>
<td>124,611</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>190,005</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>320,994</td>
<td>147,627</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>173,367</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>287,985</td>
<td>132,375</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>155,610</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>104,082</td>
<td>65,777</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>38,305</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>93,724</td>
<td>59,808</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>33,916</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>176,124</td>
<td>125,409</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>50,715</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>171,725</td>
<td>154,855</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>16,870</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1940 Decennial Census
Figure 3. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 1940

Source: 1940 Decennial Census, NYC PLUTO, January 2018 (17v1.1)
Responding to this concern, Columbia began to acquire property in a distribution that represented a fortification of the boundary of Morningside Heights. In addition to Columbia’s own property holdings, Morningside Heights, Inc. and the city of New York, facilitated projects that further fortressed Morningside Heights from its surrounding neighborhoods. Figure 4 depicts Columbia’s landholdings in 1970, spatially oriented around the Morningside Heights main campus, as well as the additional urban renewal projects, both proposed and realized, within the area. By 1970, Columbia’s expansionary period had largely ended due to the gym controversy. In addition, by this time controversy surrounding Robert Moses’ renewal efforts had reduced the feasibility of renewal projects like those he had facilitated during the 50s and 60s.
Figure 4. Columbia Landholdings and Urban Renewal Projects Attempted and Completed, 1970

Source: NYC PLUTO, January 2018 (17v1.1)
These realized developments, 2, 3, and 4, are the Manhattanville, General Grant and Morningside Gardens housing developments, respectively. The Manhattanville houses, designed in 1961 by architect Lescaze, was a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) development that consisted of 1,272 housing units (Grutzner, 1957). The development was in a superblock, “tower in the park” design scheme, and replaced tenement buildings that were demolished via slum clearance funds beginning in 1957. Also in 1957, the General Grant Houses and Morningside Gardens were constructed. Morningside Gardens was a middle-income development facilitated by Housing Act of 1949 Title I funds. Its construction involved the removal of approximately 3,000 low rent apartments within the LaSalle street area. NYCHA’s General Grant Houses, just above Morningside Gardens, were created after Morningside Heights, Inc. lobbied for the size of the renewal area to be increased. This development fulfilled two major goals of the MHI institutions in both removing low income residents from the area as well as fortifying the northern border between Morningside Heights and Harlem (Chronopoulos, 2012). Columbia also attempted to build up the northern border independently with two acquisitions designated for faculty housing at the top of Riverside Park and 125th street.

The developments which were not realized included Columbia’s northern expansion (1), the gymnasium site (5), a proposed public housing development from 108th street and 110th street (6), and a low coverage residential development proposed by Columbia, St. Luke’s Hospital, and St. John’s Cathedral from 108th to 104th streets (7).
Morningside Park as discussed, was seen as a disorderly environment that required remediation by the area’s institutions. It held particular importance as serving as the eastern border of Morningside Heights. After Robert Moses approved the site for the park in 1955, Columbia immediately enclosed the area with an eight-foot-high iron fence. At the request of MHI, in 1960 the city parks department installed gates at the park’s entrances, which were then locked each evening. MHI also hired additional private security guards and installed spotlights to illuminate the area. Following the protests of 1968, the gymnasium plan was abandoned.

Both the public housing development and the low coverage residential development that Columbia proposed for the southern border of Morningside Heights were specifically intended to remove low income Puerto Ricans from this area. Additionally, they would prevent individuals living in southern Harlem from moving into the area between Central Park and Morningside Park.

Finally, Columbia proposed an institutional expansion to the north from 125th to 135th street, would have made Columbia one of the largest urban universities within the United States. Although this project seemed plausible within the landscape of urban renewal in the 1950s, by the 1960s community opposition, a lack of funding, and a governmental shift made such a proposal no longer feasible. Columbia’s current Manhattanville expansion, however, lies within this same footprint.

With the remaking of Morningside Heights largely complete by 1970, Upper Manhattan had seen a large amount of demographic change in the 30-year period. Figure 5 demonstrates the demographic distribution of the white population in comparison to all other races in 1970. Each dot continues to represent 25 individuals, with blue symbolizing the non white population and green symbolizing the white population.
Figure 5. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 1970

Source: NYC PLUTO, January 2018 (17v1.1), Decennial Census 1970
In examining the demographic change that took place in Upper Manhattan during this time period, there is an evident decrease in population density within these neighborhoods. Although there are a multitude of factors contributing to the demographic change of this area, the literature indicates that Columbia’s property acquisition efforts had a displacement effect for the non white population. The purpose of this juxtaposition of demographic data is to identify a potential relationship between areas where Columbia acquired the majority of its parcels and the percentage change in the non white population. In examining the percent changes in the total population, white population, and non white population, there is not a clear difference in the demographic change of Morningside Heights as compared to other neighborhoods in upper Manhattan. Morningside Heights saw a 27% decrease in the nonwhite population between 1940 and 1970, but also saw a 50% decrease in the white population and a 32% decrease in the population overall. In comparison, several other neighborhoods saw a greater reduction in their non white population, including Central Harlem North, Central Harlem South, Hamilton Heights, and Manhattanville.

Table 2. Racial Composition of Upper Manhattan Neighborhoods, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Lot Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>148,975</td>
<td>9,457</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>139,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>106,190</td>
<td>12,241</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>93,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>144,488</td>
<td>56,392</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>88,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>87,243</td>
<td>22,639</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>64,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>61,956</td>
<td>25,598</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>119,893</td>
<td>62,679</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>57,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>107,694</td>
<td>72,740</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>34,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Decennial Census, 1970
Table 3. Percent Change in Racial Composition for Upper Manhattan Neighborhoods, 1940 – 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Percent Change Total</th>
<th>Percent Change White</th>
<th>Percent Change Other All Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>-53%</td>
<td>-92%</td>
<td>-84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>-67%</td>
<td>-92%</td>
<td>-75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>-57%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-66%</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-57%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>-32%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>-53%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In light of these results for the 1940 to 1970 period, census data for 1950, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 was also examined to identify if there was a significant difference between the demographic change between Morningside Heights and the other neighborhoods during any particular time period. The following figures demonstrate the racial composition of upper Manhattan during these decades, as well as Columbia’s cumulative landholdings by decade.
Figure 6. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 1950
Figure 7. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia's Property Holdings, 1960
Figure 8. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 1970
Figure 9. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia's Property Holdings, 1980
Figure 10. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 1990
Figure 11. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 2000
Figure 12. Racial Distribution within Upper Manhattan and Columbia’s Property Holdings, 2010
The following tables summarize the demographic makeup of each neighborhood by decade, as well as the percent change in the total population, the white population, and the non-white population. The tables also demonstrate the number of Columbia-owned tax lots for each decade, predominantly concentrated in Morningside Heights, but in later years also found in Manhattanville, Washington Heights South, and Hamilton Heights.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Lot Count</th>
<th>Percent Change Total</th>
<th>Percent Change White</th>
<th>Percent Change Other All Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>216,237</td>
<td>14,618</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>201,987</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-88%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>179,570</td>
<td>31,344</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>148,915</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>-79%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>223,127</td>
<td>118,722</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>104,875</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-33%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>106,145</td>
<td>40,629</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>66,535</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-38%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>67,686</td>
<td>34,406</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33,974</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>-42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>148,299</td>
<td>97,917</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>52,695</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>140,781</td>
<td>110,784</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>30,396</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>191,913</td>
<td>11,878</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>180,013</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>154,230</td>
<td>21,113</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>133,135</td>
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<td>-14%</td>
<td>-33%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>177,534</td>
<td>87,122</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>90,395</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>98,583</td>
<td>31,293</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>67,290</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>69,246</td>
<td>33,041</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>36,213</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>145,980</td>
<td>83,553</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62,401</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>117,876</td>
<td>88,404</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>29,523</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>148,975</td>
<td>9,457</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>139,518</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>106,190</td>
<td>12,241</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>93,949</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-42%</td>
<td>-29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>144,488</td>
<td>56,392</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>88,096</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>87,243</td>
<td>22,639</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>64,604</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>61,956</td>
<td>25,598</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36,358</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>119,893</td>
<td>62,679</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>57,214</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>107,694</td>
<td>72,740</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>34,955</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>110,198</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>108,068</td>
<td>98%</td>
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<td>-77%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
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<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>71,646</td>
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<td>96%</td>
<td>-33%</td>
<td>-75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>109,552</td>
<td>16,342</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>93,210</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>-71%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>79,038</td>
<td>8,492</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>70,545</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-62%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>57,507</td>
<td>10,975</td>
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<td>46,532</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-57%</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>98,924</td>
<td>39,432</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>59,492</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>109,128</td>
<td>36,215</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>72,913</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem North-Polo Grounds</td>
<td>103,939</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100,422</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Harlem South</td>
<td>70,027</td>
<td>4,699</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>65,328</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Harlem North</td>
<td>105,769</td>
<td>14,544</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>91,225</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Heights</td>
<td>76,815</td>
<td>10,986</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>67,829</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattanville</td>
<td>55,347</td>
<td>10,679</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>44,668</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morningside Heights</td>
<td>100,796</td>
<td>42,776</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58,020</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Heights South</td>
<td>118,673</td>
<td>41,173</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>77,502</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In examining the initial change between 1940 and 1950, Morningside Heights saw a 4% increase in its non white population and decreases in both its total and white populations by 16 and 22% respectively. This change represents the impetus for Columbia’s concern in isolating its campus from the surrounding community as well as its approach of aggressively property acquisition. From 1950 to 1960, despite nearly doubling their property holdings in Morningside Heights, the non white population in Morningside Heights saw an 18% increase, while the total population and white population again saw a decrease. From 1950 to 1960, the neighborhoods of Harlem North, Harlem South, and East Harlem saw a higher loss of their non white populations, seeing percent changes of -11%, -11%, and -14% respectively.

From 1960 to 1970, Columbia increased its total property holdings from 52 to 146, and saw an 18% decrease in its total population, a 25% decrease in its white population, and a 8% decrease in its non white population. During this period, Columbia acquired new properties outside the Morningside Heights boundary for the first time, with two properties in Manhattanville and seven in Washington Heights South. Manhattanville saw an overall 11% decrease in its total population, a 23% decrease in its white population, and no change in its
non white population. Washington Heights saw a 9% decrease in its total population, an 18% decrease in its white population, and an 18% increase in its non white population.

From 1970 to 1980, Morningside Heights saw again an overall decrease in its total population of 17%, and a 37% decrease in its white population. It's non white population increased by 4% during this period.

With property acquisitions somewhat stabilized after 1980, Morningside Heights saw less dramatic population losses. From 1980 to 1990, the neighborhood saw a 2% increase in its total population, an 8% increase in its white population, and 2% decrease in its non white population.

From 1990 to 2000, the neighborhood similarly saw a 4% increase in the total population, a 1% increase in the white population, and a 5% increase in the non white population. In the years between 2000 and 2010, Columbia acquired eleven addition properties within Morningside Heights, and saw a 1% increase in the total population, a 13% increase in the white population, and an 8% decrease in the non white population. More notably, in Manhattanville, where Columbia acquired 21 properties during the ten year period, the area saw a 5% decrease in the overall population, and a 15% decrease in the non white population, but a 38% increase in the white population.

Consistent with the literature, Morningside Heights saw a decrease in its percentage of non white residents through the major expansionary period of 1950 to 1970. The highest decrease Morningside Heights saw in one decade was 8%, which Morningside Heights saw from 1960 to 1970 as well as from 2000 to 2010. Overall, during the largest increase in properties acquired in Morningside Heights from 1960 to 1970 (52 to 137), the area saw substantial decreases in its total and white populations as well. From 2000 to 2010, Morningside Heights saw a 1% increase in the total population and a 13% increase in the white population. In Manhattanville from 2000 to 2010, the area saw a 5% decrease in the total population, but a 38% increase in the white population, and a 15% decrease in the non white population.
Comparison:

In examining Columbia’s two expansionary periods, there are several areas of significance for comparison. Qualitatively, of particular examination will be Columbia’s interaction and transparency with the community, as well as the city’s assistance in Columbia’s efforts. Quantitatively, the number of buildings acquired between expansion, the strategic pattern of acquisition to aid in neighborhood control, and the racial change that took place during the expansion period will be compared.

As established, Columbia’s interaction with the community during its first expansionary period in Morningside Heights was abysmal. Community resistance primarily came through informal channels, cumulating with the protests of 1968. Many of the injustices carried out by Columbia went largely with compromise, particularly in terms of tenant harassment and neglect. Columbia targeted some of the most vulnerable residents of the city living in the area’s SROs, many of whom were not able to access legal channels of opposition or were rightfully distrustful of law enforcement. This, along with the city’s assistance through Robert Moses, facilitated and enabled Columbia’s treatment of the community.

Within the process of the Manhattanville expansion, Columbia expressed its dedication to incorporating the community’s vision and involvement. This, however, appears to have been more so a public relations tactic as opposed to a genuine effort. In many ways, it appears that Columbia’s concern over the media opinion over its treatment of the community transcends its actual concern of how it is treating the community. In fact, the end of Columbia’s expansionary period following 1968 can be attributed primarily to the public relations crisis that the school was facing.

Community resistance to Columbia’s Manhattanville expansion plan came primarily through the formal channel of the 197-a plan. The 197-a plan notably did not call for Columbia to avoid expansion into the Manhattanville neighborhood. Instead, the plan encouraged contextual and inclusionary zoning so that the university could expand within the context of the
existing community. Columbia, however, would not accept any compromise to its proposal. While a contextual expansion would allow Columbia with a valuable opportunity to work towards the socio-spatial barrier that its own actions facilitated in the decades prior, Columbia was determined to implement the version of its plan that allowed it to take over the entire footprint of the site with singular ownership. The hypocrisy of Columbia being considered a liberal institution while it actively worked to combat integration around its own campus during the 1950s, is only matched by this promise to work with a community that the university unequivocally intended to remove from the map.

Provided with clear evidence of the community’s wishes, Columbia pursued its plan exactly as served its own interests. Prior to the plan’s approval, Columbia had utilized its economic power to purchase property in Manhattanville far before the plan was formally announced in 2003, characteristic of the university’s efforts to act without transparency and in the manner of a private real estate developer. Columbia also spent millions of dollars the hire lobbyists to win city and state support for their plan (Williams, 2007). Following the proposal, Columbia only attended the public forums required by New York’s ULURP process and never worked directly with any community members or groups. Finally, the alleged collusion with the Empire State Development Corporation and the city’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC) to declare the area as blighted through biased studies only further underscore the community’s distrust in Columbia. As Jordi Reyes-Montblanc, chairman of a local community board stated, “On a scale of 1 to 10, Columbia is a minus 5 in terms of trust” (Williams, 2006).

The city planning department’s approval of Columbia’s 197-c plan instead of the 197-a plan of community board 9 is perhaps the most significant evidence of the city’s facilitation of Columbia’s efforts. Both the city and state refused to back a plan that did not allow for Columbia’s complete redevelopment of the area. On the state level, the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) also facilitated the use of eminent domain. It is also interesting to note that at the time of the expansion announcement, the city and state began a
$12 million plan to rebuild the Harlem piers on the waterfront between St. Clair Place and 133rd Street for recreational use (Bagli, 2003). At the time, the city was also working with the local community board, Columbia, and others in pushing for a neighborhood rezoning, although that did not materialize (Bagli, 2003).

On a larger level, the reasons stated for the city’s support of the 197-c plan are the aspect most similar to the motivations of the city's complicities within the expansionary period of the 1950s-1970s. In emphasizing Columbia’s importance to the city, and its importance in increasing New York’s reputation around the world, the city once again privileged a planning process that emphasized the creation of a globalized megacity over democratic, community-based, and participatory processes.

Ultimately, Columbia is only interested in working with communities of its own design. In examining the numbers of tax lots acquired, Columbia’s acquisitions during the Manhattanville Expansion are less than those acquired during the initial expansionary period. In comparison to the literature, the number of tax lots acquired is significantly less than the number of buildings acquired. This is because there are often separate structures on a tax lot. A parcel level analysis was not possible for this reason, as well as the fact that Columbia often demolished the structures on a given lot to create a different number of structures. Beginning in 2002, Columbia began to acquire the lots within the footprint of its Manhattanville expansion, although at the time the development was not yet public. The university acquired eight properties in 2002, four in 2006, seven in 2007, and four in 2008. From 2001 to present, Columbia has acquired a total of 42 tax lots. Overall, the 17 acres of total redevelopment is extremely significant in considering that Columbia’s initial purchase in Morningside Heights was 32 acres in total.

In regards to strategic acquisition for neighborhood control, there is an obvious difference with the Manhattanville expansion in that it involved the complete acquisition of a project area versus that of strategic parcels. It appears logical the Manhattanville area was targeted predominantly due to its proximity to Columbia’s main campus, and the fact that the
university already owned about 40% of the buildings within the project footprint. Additional considerations, however, may have related again to the ideas of “social disorder” that motivated Columbia’s efforts in the 1950s. The Manhattanville neighborhood is a predominantly industrial area of warehouses, auto-repair shops and a meatpacking plant, which may not fit into Columbia’s idea of an ideal neighbor. Columbia emphasizes that the plan for the new campus will have no walls or gates, and will have publicly accessible green spaces and glass-walled buildings that are nearly transparent and open to the public on the street level (“A New Campus Comes to Life,” 2017). As Community Board 9 stated, Columbia’s plan involved the removal of valuable community businesses and residences, and replace them with research and classroom facilities that, even with access, have little direct benefit for community members.

In addition, many community members fear that Columbia’s entrance into this area will cut the surrounding community off from the West Harlem Waterfront park running from 129th and 133rd streets along the Hudson River. The campaign for the park began in 1998 with a partnership between Harlem Organization WE ACT, an environmental justice group that works to achieve healthy communities, and Community Board 9. The plan was accepted in 2000 (“WE ACT, n.d.). Figure 13 Depicts the Manhattanville Expansion project footprint, along with the parcels Columbia has acquired within the boundary as of January, 2018.
Figure 13. Manhattanville Expansion Project Footprint and Columbia Owned Parcels, 2018

Source: NYC PLUTO, January 2018 (17v1.1)
In regards to the racial change analysis, there are undoubtedly several other forces affecting demographic change other than Columbia’s property acquisition. Additional insight into the impact of Columbia’s properties may be evident on a smaller geographic level or with population data for more frequent intervals. However, within the peak decade of acquisition, 1960 to 1970, the Morningside Heights neighborhood saw a significant 8% decrease in its non white population. In the peak decade of acquisition from 2000 to 2010 for the Manhattanville neighborhood, the area saw a 15% decrease in its non white population and a 38% increase in its white population. When Columbia entered the Morningside Heights neighborhood in 1892, the area was largely undeveloped and had only a small residential population. In Columbia’s Manhattanville expansion, it is important to remember the context of Manhattanville as an already established and existing neighborhood.
Conclusions and Recommendations:

Columbia University is a private institution. When considering the role of universities within their communities, there are no stipulations that a university’s real estate acquisition practices should require any sort of different or higher standards of institutional procedures and ethics in real estate deals. In many ways, the university is primarily responsible to its primary constituencies, and thus operates with the intentions of what will attract and retain good students and faculty and what its donors will support. Because universities are often among the largest landowners and employers in cities, as well as major consumers of private goods and public services, they have a large number of external constituencies as well. This makes it fairly clear that universities have institutional demands to be obligated to consider community concerns within their real estate acquisition efforts. Primarily, their tax-exempt status presents the question of what services the university should provide to an area in lieu of the property taxes that would otherwise support civil services like the fire and police departments. Additionally, universities typically have institutional missions which emphasize their commitment to an overall advancement of knowledge and a commitment to their physical location, absent of a qualifier for only those directly involved with the institution.

Ultimately, outside of their obligations, all anchor institutions, and universities in particular, need support from community and political leaders to thrive. These actors will generally expect a significant contribution to local quality of life in exchange for permission to grow.

Columbia in particular has faced significant obstacles due to its lack of trust from the surrounding community. Throughout the school’s extensive history within New York City, Columbia has acted largely as a private real estate developer, as assisted by a city government that recognizes its economic and social benefits to the city. With each desire for the school to acquire property and expand, Columbia has gone about doing so with predominantly its own interests in mind.
It appears that the critical source of mistrust from the community today comes from Columbia’s lack of transparency. In declaring themselves a “different neighbor” at the outset of the Manhattanville expansion, Columbia continued to acquire real estate in insidious ways. For Columbia to actively improve their community relations and become the benefit to upper Manhattan that it claims, it needs to first to commit to the honesty that the surrounding community deserves. This pertains not only to Columbia’s current Manhattanville expansion plan, but also in fully revealing the actions the university took through its first expansion period. The university’s landholdings should be public information, as well as the acquisition dates of these parcels. Requests for both were denied during the period of this research.

It is important for Columbia to acknowledge what it has done incorrectly in the past in order to regain the community’s trust, rather than simply providing rhetoric emphasizing its new approach. The CBA agreement means little without the context of the millions of dollars the school generated from properties in which Columbia evicted thousands. Promising to not utilize eminent domain only until a property owner is unwilling to sell is not a strategic approach towards working with the community. True transparency involves much more than simply constructing see through buildings. For Columbia to truly become a “good neighbor” to Morningside Heights, Manhattanville, Upper Manhattan, and New York City, it must recognize the asset that being within the city holds and allow its real estate acquisition practices to reflect that reality.
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