INSTITUTIONALIZING CO-PRODUCTION IN THE CONSERVATION AND RENEWAL OF RESIDENTIAL URBAN HERITAGES IN SHANGHAI: The Obstacles and Solutions

Miao Hu
Tongji University

Abstract: In Shanghai, the spatial division inside residential heritages is intricate. Even the smallest top-down renewal projects involve several households’ interests. Without an “empowered participatory governance” (Fung and Wright 2003), communities tend to form intense exclusion, refusing government interventions (Tallon 2013). Under such background, in 2017, the author accompanied a co-producing renewal process along with the Shanghai Xuhui district and communities.

This paper reviews the co-production theory, summarizes its advantages of meeting individual demands and utilizing residents’ initiative inputs, its nature of breaking current rules and using conflicts tactics, as well as its drawbacks of potential structural and fire-fighting dangers of buildings, as shown in the “Dream Home” TV program.

Then the paper examines the case of No.620 West Jianguo Road, a pilot project of institutionalizing the co-production, aiming at bringing out its merits and eliminating its defects. Two obstacles in this process are elaborated and the reasons for them are analyzed: a) The intricate interests within residents are hard to coordinate only by designers, but the current mechanism doesn’t enable the residents to reach a consensus beforehand or integrate them into the design phase. b) The division of ownership and use-right in the history causes unequal duties and rights and mutually restricted power between the residents and the state, resulting in the state’s inability to occupy or repair its property as well as the reluctance to support the residents’ initiative repair.

Afterward, the paper proposes corresponding solutions based on relevant practical references, focusing on optimizing and deepening the mechanism of state-community engagement in the residential renewal, and adjusting the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of the owners and users.

To sum up, this research suggests that a “public-sector led” co-production may be still possible, with a changed power balance and certain modification to the current rules, and could achieve unexpected results when the state has difficulty in delivering services; whereas the shift of planners’ roles indicates that empowerment may be gradually taking place.

Keywords: Co-production, historic conservation, residential urban heritage, urban renewal, Shanghai

INTRODUCTION

Shanghai has a wealth of residential historic urban heritage resources, with a large area and a wide range, including numerous high-quality residential buildings, apartments, and garden houses. However, long-term, over-loaded, and extensive use has accelerated the aging of the buildings, causing their living environment to deteriorate continuously, making their protection and renewal often unsatisfactory.

For a long time, relocating the residents as a whole and adjusting the buildings’ function were among the main approaches to renewing historic blocks, which, however, left two drawbacks: a) The buildings with lower protection-degree and less-prominent historic value, or those, whose stock is still large, are often demolished and replaced with high-rise buildings by developers in the desire for the maximum economic benefit. b) The removal of many indigenous residents in a short time causes irreparable damage to the communities’ social networks, as well as an abnormal growth of social structure and urban fabric in the region.

The ever-increasing costs and the difficulty of resettlement drove Shanghai to seek a new method of redevelopment and resulted in the city’s clear statement in 2016 that 7.3 million square meters of traditional dwellings in the central city should be conserved. Since the gradual decrease of the excessive residents’ amount still takes a considerably long time, the government undertook the improvement of the interior living condition of historic buildings step by step, expecting that residents’ private investment can be incentivized through public investments like the addition of a private kitchen and bathroom.

However, this “indoor spatial renewal” faced no small challenge. The interior space segmentation of
Institutionalizing Co-production in the Conversation and Renewal of Residential Urban Heritage in Shanghai

Shanghai’s residential heritage is quite complex, and even the tiniest top-down renewal projects involve the interests of several households. Without “empowered participatory governance” (Fung and Wright 2003), communities tend to form strong oppositions and resist the government’s intervention (Tallon 2013).

A typical case is Jukui New Village (figure 1), a community with three-story historic buildings built in the planned economy era. It lacks kitchen and bathroom facilities, but has a large number of households and informal construction: 262 of the 309 households in the community constructed 432 illegal structures; the original 2 to 3 meter-wide alleys were gradually eroded by the residents’ self-constructed “small compartments”; the spontaneous structures were built up to six floors tall, supported by a mere two thin steel pipes. All of these caused damage to the architecture and brought about security risks. In 2016, the government began to renovate the buildings and tried to add private kitchens and bathrooms for the residents as much as possible. The results of the repair were acknowledged and praised by the residents and the public at first, however, after a few months, nearly 70% of the residents petitioned and complained. The reason is that, after comparing with each other, the residents found that due to various considerations, such as construction quality and the interior spatial layout, the space added by the designers to each household was not completely equal, causing strong dissatisfaction among the residents. At that time, the residents had already signed agreements with the government and moved back in, and the design could not be changed anymore. Residents believed that, since the repair work was led by the government, the “loss” caused by the uneven distribution of interests should be compensated by the government as well. In the end, the government was overwhelmed with responsibilities, and the preservation and renovation became stuck in a deadlocked-situation.

Given this context, the Shanghai Xuhui District Housing Management Bureau proposed to explore a method of “co-producing residential renewal”, expecting to resolve conflicts of interests and achieve satisfactory renewal results, by encouraging residents’ initiative action and acknowledging their contributions and efforts in the renewal.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. INTERNATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CO-PRODUCTION

Co-production is a term of state-society engagement around urban development issues, which is often related to the cases (especially in the global South), in which the poor communities rely on their capability to improve their living conditions. Its background is the obvious progressive ineffectiveness of formal democracy in achieving the democratic political ideal (Fung and Wright 2003). Therefore, an “empowered participatory governance” with an institutional design is needed, which counts on the input and ability of ordinary people, and ties action to debates (Fung and Wright 2003). This also indicates the state-society engagement has entered a “post-collaborative” phase, with the focus shifting to the difficulties met in the process, as well as the context and conditions in which participation takes place (Brownill and Parker 2010).

The term “co-production” originated from the political economist Elinor Ostrom in 1996 and was defined as a process where the inputs of individuals not in the same group are transformed into goods and services (Ostrom 1996). It emphasizes the complementary advantages of the government (in resources, technical experts, and trunk service) and communities (in local information, time, skills, and feeder service), which generates a synergistic effect leading to better results. Compared with the former concepts of...

Figure 1: Jukui New Village before (left) and after (right) renovation. (http://sh.sina.com.cn/news/m/2020-07-23/detail-iivhvpwx6958937-p3.shtml)
"collaborative" and "communicative" planning, these three concepts are not approaches to radical social changes, but about state-society cooperation in improving the citizens' living conditions (Watson 2014). However, the co-producing method often inevitably goes beyond, or even counter to the existing governance rules, and underscores the importance of communities' gradual empowerment (Watson 2014), while the other two concepts are always carried out within the existing rules, regarding power only in deliberative planning process and assuming its destructive effect can be overcome through debate (Huxley 2000).

Co-production has different variants interpreted by scholars. Bovaird (2007) argues co-producing means a redistribution of power, which is highly political and could result in undesirable social effects; it is, therefore, necessary to "reserve power of state regulation". Whereas the social movement initiated co-production affords power against that of the state, with community organizations and NGOs playing an important role, its practice could be a combination of both conflict (protests for example) and cooperation (Bradlow 2013).

Traditional planning tools like survey and mapping, which used to be held within the government, are seen by co-production as a combination of power and knowledge and used by marginalized groups to claim space and speak back to the state (Watson 2014). In some cases, the whole process from the survey, visioning, and construction to management has been undertaken by the community, is referred to as a self-mapping and approved by the state; the role of the state here lies mainly in granting land and tenure, and providing larger infrastructure (Archer 2012). Correspondingly, architects and urban planners also shift from "know-all" professional experts to community supporters, in the recognition that "only the poor know how to live in poverty." Co-production argues that planners should "offer right guidance rather than control the whole progress", should "ask right questions" rather than provide answers, should play a "teaching role" to train communities towards sustainable development without the planners' intervention (Archer et al. 2012).

What is noticeable here is that power and conflicts within the community need paying attention to (Robins et al. 2008). As well, the form and effectiveness of co-production may differ in alternate contexts. Although co-production is a more radical method seeking the "fundamental change of the power balance," it could still be "public-sector led" (Albrechts 2013).

**1.2. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CO-PRODUCTION IN CHINA**

In China, with the economic system reform deepening, the community has gradually taken on more social tasks and became the focus of urban governance. Its essence lies in advocating the dispersion of power and adopting a city development method with local suitability and uniqueness (Wang 2006).

In recent years, with regard to the "co-producing" preservation and renewal of residential urban heritages, Chinese scholars have proposed different institutional construction strategies, such as the establishment of a communication and dialogue mechanism like hearings and workshops (Zhang 2004), the appointment of community planners (Ye 2006), the introduction of non-profit organizations to mediate the contradictions in urban renewal (Hong L. 2013), and the empowerment of neighborhood committees to manage communities' public welfare affairs on their own (Ouyang 2015). Strategies of adjusting the property rights' relationship were put forward as well, such as the privatization of property rights (Xiao 2004), the socialization of property rights (Wang et al. 2004), or the public-private-shared ownership of property rights (Guo 2007), etc., aiming at encouraging residents' investment and dedication in housing protection and repair, through the establishment of a differentiated property rights system. However, scholars generally believe that the current depth and breadth of residents' engagement is far from enough, and its participant, organizational capacity, and impact on planning is still weak when lacking professional support (Hong and Zhao 2013; Zhao and Li 2015; Ouyang and Ye 2015).

**1.3. "DREAM HOME" PROGRAM AS AN ENLIGHTENMENT**

A TV Program from Shanghai called "Dream Home" took the lead in introducing a new situation of "co-producing" residential renewal methods. In this program, the households living in historic buildings (often owned by the state) ask the TV station for renovation help and the TV group invites architects to create interior designs. The results show that such renovation focused on residents' individual demands, motivates the initiative of residents' repairs, has high repair efficiency, generates satisfactory results, and fosters the community's acquisition of knowledge by showing and learning by doing (McFarlane 2011), and thus has received a lot of praise and attention from the academy. On the other hand, this method also received criticism from the government departments (i.e. the district real estate corporation and the housing management department). Due to the lack of institutionalized rules and residents' and designers' inadequate knowledge of housing structure and heritage protection, renovations often dig the foundation or remove load-bearing walls to improve the indoor spatial layout, resulting in damage to the historic buildings' integrity and safety, which also runs
counter to the goal of historic preservation and the improvement of residents’ living conditions. However, because of the potential it has, the housing management department of Xuhui District of Shanghai still decided to institutionalize this renewal method, with the residents’ self-conducted repair standardized and guided. No. 620 West Jianguo Road was chosen as a pilot case.

2. A CASE OF INSTITUTIONALIZING CO-PRODUCING RESIDENTIAL RENEWAL: NO.620 WEST JIANGUO ROAD

No. 620 West Jianguo Road (figure 2) is a three-story garden house built in 1924, adjacent to the Polish consulate, and acknowledged as an outstanding historical building. It covers an area of about 130 m², with a brick and wood structure in the German Jugendstil. The building was once used as a kindergarten and later assigned to the kindergarten staff as a welfare house, with a modified layout. After a long period of development, there are currently fourteen households in this building, with a total area of less than 400 m². The residential density far exceeds the initial design parameters.

Each floor can be divided into two parts: private rooms, where households live, and public spaces, where two small washrooms and a kitchen are located and shared by the residents living on the same floor. The public space is divided intricately and occupied by different households following an unwritten rule. The smallest household living area is only 5.8 m², located on the ground floor, and the overall living condition is sub-standard.

In March 2017, the Xuhui District Government researched the conservation and repair plan for the building, aiming to improve the internal living conditions, according to the residents’ demands and with their own engagement. A design team from Tongji University was entrusted with coordination, in which the author is also a key member. During the community sessions, residents generally expressed their hopes for individual private kitchens and washrooms, and the designers started to develop a plan based on this request. However, the institutionalizing process of co-production revealed that two obstacles still need to be tackled.

2.1. FIRST OBSTACLE: INTERNAL INTERESTS’ CONFLICTS AND DEFECTIVE PARTICIPANT MECHANISM

The first practical difficulty is the complex relationship of interests among the residents. Under the current public participant procedure, residents are rarely integrated into the renewal design, and it is therefore hard to achieve a consensus.

In the first version of the design, some units of private spaces were changed, and some indoor living spaces were moved to make room for separate kitchens and bathrooms, while the original public space on each floor was retained. However, this design was opposed by the residents. The residents believed that the private living space of the building should be at their own disposal, whereas the government’s intervention should be restricted only to the public part and should not interfere in their private rooms.

In the second version of the design (figure 3), the public space on each floor was divided into independent kitchens and bathrooms as much as possible, according to the residents’ requirements, and was integrated into the private rooms of the residents, so that each household could enjoy individual kitchens.

Figure 2: Current Situation of No. 620 West Jianguo Road.
(Author 2017)
and bathrooms while keeping the original living area from being decreased. However, the inequality of the increased kitchen and bathroom areas between each household is still inevitable. For example, the No. 5 and No. 2 households on the ground floor have the most obvious contrast: the original living area of the No. 2 household is 5.8 m², and the design plan increases the kitchen, bathroom, and storage room area by 9.42 m², which is about 162.4% of the original living area; the original living area of the No. 5 household is 24.9 m², and the design plan increases the kitchen and bathroom area by 8.51 m², which is about 34.2% of the original living area. The increased kitchen and bathroom areas have a large gap in proportion, which incited opposition from the No. 5 household. They believed that, since their original living area was 3.29 times larger than that of the No. 2, in order to be fair the kitchen and bathroom allocated to them should also be much larger than that of the No. 2 household. A similar situation also involves the No. 3 household on the ground floor who did not agree to give part of their original living area to the No. 6 household as a kitchen and bathroom, although their spatial loss was compensated accordingly in the design. The extensive work of coordinating such interests tired out the designers and slowed down the renewal progress.

An ideal method would be for the residents to reach a consensus on the distribution of benefits at the beginning and get directly involved in the design procedures, and the designer designing, according to the residents’ instruction. Currently, an appropriate mechanism is lacking. In the present state-owned buildings’ renewal project, there are two main links involving the residents’ participation (figure 4):
a) Consultation and entrustment: The renewal plan should seek the opinion of all the tenants or owners of the buildings, and obtain more than two-thirds of the tenants or owners’ approval, before a construction team can be entrusted and the implementation begun.
b) Signing the agreement: For the design and the comprehensive implementation plan of the renewal projects, the property owner (in most cases the housing management department) should sign an agreement with all the residents.

However, there is no institutionalized residents’ cooperation introduced during the key phase of “planning and design” that involves “what to renew”, and the phase of “implementation” that involves “how to renew and who leads the renewal”. Participation is relatively low-level and is concentrated in the later stage of the renewal project, resulting in the asymmetry of

Figure 3: Current situation (left) and the renewal plan (right) of No.620 West Jianguo Road. (Author 2017)
Institutionalizing Co-production in the Conversation and Renewal of Residential Urban Heritage in Shangai

information and the lack of communication between the design team and the residents. As seen in the “Jukui New Village”, when the residents collectively poured into the phase of “signing agreements” at the same time and were asked to accept the renewal design, long-standing conflicts would inevitably break out.

2.2. SECOND OBSTACLE: UNEQUAL DUTIES AND MUTUALLY RESTRICTED POWER BETWEEN THE RESIDENTS AND THE STATE

The second difficulty encountered by the renewal project was that when submitted for official review, the design proposal, which was finally negotiated with the residents, was rejected by the government. The reason lies in the special system of property rights (figure 5). Shanghai’s residential historic buildings are mainly state-owned, whose property rights are divided into two parts: the ownership belongs to the government, and the right to use the house belongs to the residents, whose names with corresponding living areas are recorded in the official documents. The use-right was once given to citizens as welfare during the planned economy era, and with the promulgation of a series of legal norms in the last decades, the use-right of the state-owned houses was gradually recognized as a formal part of the property rights. In the current public housing lease relationship, the house is practically controlled by the use-right holders. For example, the residents can enjoy the right to lease the house at a very low rent for unlimited time. They can also enjoy the full profit (usually dozens of times the rent paid to the government), if the house is sublet. But when there is an (even very tiny) problem with the house, and it needs repairing, the residents will always turn to the property owner (the government) for help.

Thus, a paradox is apparent. On the one hand, the government undertakes a large number of repairing obligations, but is unable to exercise its rights of using or disposing of the state-owned houses and cannot obtain the benefits brought by the renewal of the houses. Without the permission of the use-right holder, the government is not even able to repair or renew the internal structure or space of the house. For example, the previous “water supply” improvement project was often resisted by the residents because it might bring tiny changes to their living space. The government invested a lot but gained no return and has thus, in the end, only limited enthusiasm for such initiative. On the other hand, unless the government department agrees, the residents, as well, cannot carry out house repairs or renewals arbitrarily. The responsibilities of the government and residents are not equivalent, and their power is mutually restricted. As a result, in the past, residents’ inappropriate and careless use of the houses has been the norm. Some buildings have even been treated with an attitude of “let it decay” by the residents to obtain the compensation for demolishment.

3. SOLUTION FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CO-PRODUCING RESIDENTIAL RENEWAL

Given the two obstacles above, this paper refers to relevant practical cases and proposes solutions, focusing on improving and deepening the mechanism of state-community engagement in the residential renewal, and adjusting the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of the owners and users.

Figure 4: Current renewal process of state-held houses in Shanghai. (Author 2017)
3.1. AUTONOMOUS NEGOTIATING MECHANISM AND ACCOMPANYING PLANNING PROCEDURES

Given the residents' intricate spatial interests, it is first necessary to establish an appropriate internal negotiating mechanism for subsequent successful design work. A suggestion here is to rely on the resident committee's strong social capital, and let the committee conduct the coordination autonomously, with the help of external professional social organizations.

A valuable reference is the "Family Indoor Renovation Project" carried out by the Bund community in Huangpu District in 2016, in cooperation with the non-profit organization Habitat for Humanity. The project was technically supported by professional volunteers convened by the social organization, and financially supported with funds donated by enterprises. The community committee first recorded the demands and backgrounds of the voluntarily participant families and organized the hearings to select the suitable households. Then the qualified households reached an agreement with the social organization before the renewal started on issues such as neighborhood mediation, legitimate renovation, and no-sublet. In this way, the coordination could be completed at the beginning of the project, thus facilitating the implementation afterward.

As well, a repair-items-list could be formulated along with the establishment of the renewal project. Residents living in the same building unit can act as a whole and select what needs repairing. After a consensus is reached, they should ask for neighbors' opinions and propose the renewal application to the government. Then, the relevant departments offer investment and qualified construction teams to help with implementation. During the design phase, the designers and residents can form a temporary co-working team. Meanwhile, certain financial power and authority should be given to the community committee, so that they can integrate and utilize the resources and manage community affairs independently.

Successful experience can be drawn from the mechanism of elevator construction in old communities in Shanghai. It is organized autonomously by the agreement of 90% of the residents in the same building and two-thirds of the residents in the community. After completion, the residents can receive a subsidy of up to 40% of the cost, to not exceed 240,000 CNY. The community committee and relevant departments are supposed to assist in the application and approval procedures. With a strong initiative, willingness to act and a well-developed policy system, in the first half-year of 2019, 311 old buildings were equipped with elevators effectively.

To acknowledge and include the residents' efforts in the design and obtain a satisfactory renewal result, the establishment of the community-planner-system should be accelerated, the design-workshops and regular hearings should be introduced, and the residents should be accompanied by professionals and engage themselves in the preservation and renewal of residential urban heritage.

The Chengxingli renewal project (figure 6) in Huangpu district from 2018 brought forward a "one design for one household" strategy, in which the designers communicated with each household at the very beginning of the project, recorded their demands and the way they use or change the rooms, and modified the design several times to suit the residents’ original living conditions. The design is detailed into the types of window opening and the location of furniture. In fact, a "customized service list" was formulated in the renewal, where residents could customize the area of the added kitchens and washrooms, the appearance of the furniture, as well as the location of the electrical sockets.

3.2. ADJUSTING BENEFITS-RELATIONS AND CLARIFYING POWER AND DUTIES BETWEEN THE RESIDENTS AND THE GOVERNMENTS

As to adjusting the property relationship, institutional economics believes that property rights include all rights to resource utilization and compose the "rights bunch",...
and thus possessing the whole property rights is only an ideal. For residential urban heritages, which are usually owned by the state, since the use-right holders are allowed legally to sublease the houses for profit, the property owner could further transfer certain rights to use-right holders, including the self-conducted repair and renewal, and encourage such actions. Meanwhile, governments should adjust the current rent rules to set differentiated rents for the sublet and self-occupied houses respectively, which can also be seen as taking back part of the right of subletting and profiting.

A successful reference here is the “Les Pentes de la Croix-Rousse” in Lyon, France. It encourages residents of historic neighborhoods to renovate their own houses with differentiated subsidies, which are classified into two kinds, based on whether the house is for self-occupation or sublet. For sublet houses, if the owner is to rent at a market price, then they will receive no more than 25% of the renovation cost; if the owner agrees to rent at the price of social houses in nine years, they will receive no more than 55% of the renovation cost; if the owner rents at the lowest housing price, they will receive up to 85% of the renovation cost. For self-occupied houses, the government will offer subsidies according to their family incomes. Meanwhile, the city assists the residents in the repair management through an NGO. If the tenant of the social houses were not able to pay rents in time, the NGO would pay for them in advance, so that the income of the house-owners would not be affected.

For the balancing of the residents’ and government’s responsibilities and rights, a Guideline toward Preservation and Utilization can be formulated to clarify what kinds of autonomous, self-repair actions by residents are approved. Currently, Tongji University has been entrusted to formulate the Guideline for Preservation and Utilization of Yide Apartment by Jing’an District Government and the author is among the key team members. The guideline stipulates the key protected architectural parts, the permitted items of self-conducted repair and their requirements, the repairs that should be reported to the government for review and their corresponding procedures. It aims to improve the working efficiency of historic preservation, regulate residents’ daily maintenance activity, and avoid possible damages to the urban heritage.

CONCLUSION

Co-production can meet residents’ demand, utilize individual inputs effectively and achieve unexpected results when the state is unwilling or unable to deliver services (Watson 2014). Meanwhile, co-production often goes beyond or counter to the existing rules and use conflict tactics. However, co-production may still be “public-sector led” in certain contexts, although the power balance has fundamentally changed (Albrechts 2013). Therefore, it is possible to highlight the advantages of residents’ own initiative and eliminate potential institutional costs and social risks, by institutionalizing co-production actively and adjusting current rules.

The case of No. 620 West Jianguo Road indicates the conflicting interests within the communities can become an endogenous influence against a successful co-production, and the power-relations (property included) between the residents and the state can be a restraining factor. A good co-production needs an effective internal negotiating mechanism for the community, the willingness, ability, and recognition of the residents’ self-mapping or design, as well as empowerment from the state. For this, current rules may have to offer more potential openings. Meanwhile, the state ought to formulate repair-guidelines to clarify and restrict residents’ actions and adjust the relation of benefits in the state-society engagement and restore the balance of power.

Noticeable is the work of planners shifting from expert driven reviews to “action-research approach”
Miao Hu (Huchzermeyer and Misselwitz 2016), as shown in Jianguo Road 620. "Mapping and planning" as a combination of power and knowledge (Watson 2014) also shifts from being held by the state to being shared with the community, even partly conducted by residents independently, which suggests the empowerment may be gradually taking place.

It is worth discussing how to define or redefine "community design," "participatory design," and "community architects" in the specific context, namely use-right without property rights.

In Shanghai, the origin of community design is similar to that of the US in the 1960s, when it was recognized that professional design techniques alone are inadequate in resolving social problems (Sanoff 2006), and that its main purpose, likewise, offering design and planning services for residents (often economically disadvantaged groups) to involve them in shaping and managing their environment (Sanoff 2006). More non-profit community organizations are likely to subsequently emerge in Shanghai too. However, while the capacity of community design centers in the US address environmental risks and poverty is diminishing, and the groups with economic clout use participatory techniques to resist changes, enhance their power and secure their quality-of-life (Sanoff 2006), in Shanghai, such contradiction lies not between the poor and affluent groups, but more in the intricate spatial interests among residents and in the power-benefits relations between the state and communities. Hence, the establishment of a negotiating mechanism and the adjustment of the property system are two core dimensions. For a successful interior spatial renewal of historic houses, residents must be empowered with authority and responsibility to take proactive actions instead of resistant ones (Sanoff 2006), with residents seen as the center in both planning and implementation, which resembles community building in the US, to some extent.

Similarly, in Shanghai’s context, participation should focus more on how to achieve an accurate balance among residents’ spatial interests via in-depth co-work and further realize their full range of needs and desires in the design (Milgrom 1998), rather than serving as a tool for "defending exclusionary, conservative principles" or for "promoting social justice and ecological vision" (Sanoff 2006). Consultation is inadequate alone since it only represents the lowest common solutions, which the majority can tolerate (Milgrom 1998).

In co-productive process, "community architects" should help individuals be included in the decision-making process (Milgrom 1998) and assume a more proactive role than their traditional counterparts, who thought they knew best how people should live (Sanoff 2006). They should also serve as representatives for the residents and advocate for their benefits before the state.

REFERENCES
Institutionalizing Co-production in the Conversation and Renewal of Residential Urban Heritage in Shangai


