Monitoring Versus Incentives

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11556

Title: Monitoring Versus Incentives
Author: Gilson, Paul W. R.
Abstract: My study examines the relationship between principal and agent in a moral hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort and can result in a reallocation of project payoffs between the two parties. This reallocation is not a one-way street: Situations exist where monitoring encourages greater effort from the agent, resulting in greater project payoffs for both principal and agent. For projects that are characterized as high-risk, high-reward projects where agent involvement is costly, monitoring is often the optimal strategy; this is an explanation for why venture capital type investments are the subject of intense monitoring. When the principal can share monitoring results at an interim stage with the agent, the agent is able to modify his effort levels in certain situations for the benefit of both parties.
Type: Dissertation
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11556
Date: 2006-07-07
Publisher: Georgia Institute of Technology
Subject: Principal and agent
Moral hazard
Entrepreneurship
Incentives
Monitoring
Department: Management
Advisor: Committee Co-Chair: Jayaraman, Narayanan; Committee Co-Chair: Nachman, David; Committee Member: Chakrabarti, Rajesh; Committee Member: Church, Bryan; Committee Member: Eun, Cheol
Degree: Ph.D.

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