Intra-Household decision making: Bargaining over Expenditures in Rural Households in Senegal
Dia Sow, Fatimata
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In rural Senegalese households, husband and wife earn their income separately. However, the desire of each agent is to contribute to the well-being of the household. A relevant question in this respect is whether the spouses pool their incomes or keep them separated to some extent. For economists, "pooling income" refers to models where husband’s and wife‘s incomes are summed, so that a transfers of money from the husband to the wife or vice versa do not alter the partners’ expenditure patterns. However, women’s "empowerment" research assumes a link between the decisionmaking authority within the household and expenditures. The study comprises data from 300 rural dual-headed households in two areas in Senegal on which we estimate Engel curves for the analysis of "income pooling" in expenditures. The results refute income pooling for all goods and show the weakness of the unitary model of the household. Also, the contribution of each agent depends on a number of factors, especially income and other exogenous variables. The study comprises data from 300 rural households on which we estimate Engel curves for the analysis of "income pooling" in expenditures. Finally, this study highlights important determinants of female and male expenditures associated with individual and community factors.