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dc.contributor.advisorShamma, Jeff
dc.contributor.authorDudebout, Nicolas
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-27T13:33:18Z
dc.date.available2014-08-27T13:33:18Z
dc.date.created2014-08
dc.date.issued2014-04-25
dc.date.submittedAugust 2014
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1853/52205
dc.description.abstractThe objective of this research is to develop the framework of empirical-evidence equilibria (EEEs) in stochastic games. This framework was developed while attempting to design decentralized controllers using learning in stochastic games. The overarching goal is to enable a set of agents to control a dynamical system in a decentralized fashion. To do so, the agents play a stochastic game crafted such that its equilibria are decentralized controllers for the dynamical system. Unfortunately, there exists no algorithm to compute equilibria in stochastic games. One explanation for this lack of results is the full-rationality requirement of game theory. In the case of stochastic games, full rationality imposes that two requirements be met at equilibrium. First, each agent has a perfect model of the game and of its opponents strategies. Second, each agent plays an optimal strategy for the POMDP induced by its opponents strategies. Both requirements are unrealistic. An agent cannot know the strategies of its opponents; it can only observe the combined effect of its own strategy interacting with its opponents. Furthermore, POMDPs are intractable; an agent cannot compute an optimal strategy in a reasonable time. In addition to these two requirements, engineered agents cannot carry perfect analytical reasoning and have limited memory; they naturally exhibit bounded rationality. In this research, bounded rationality is not seen as a limitation and is instead used to relax the two requirements. In the EEE framework, agents formulate low-order empirical models of observed quantities called mockups. Mockups have unmodeled states and dynamic effects, but they are statistically consistent; the empirical evidence observed by an agent does not contradict its mockup. Each agent uses its mockup to derive an optimal strategy. 1Since agents are interconnected through the system, these mockups are sensitive to the specific strategies employed by other agents. In an EEE, the two requirements are weakened. First, each agent has a consistent mockup of the game and the strategies of its opponents. Second, each agent plays an optimal strategy for the MDP induced by its mockup. The main contribution of this dissertation is the use of modeling to study stochastic games. This approach, while common in engineering, had not been applied to stochastic games.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherGeorgia Institute of Technology
dc.subjectEquilibrium
dc.subjectStochastic games
dc.subjectBounded rationality
dc.titleEmpirical-evidence equilibria in stochastic games
dc.typeDissertation
dc.description.degreePh.D.
dc.contributor.departmentElectrical and Computer Engineering
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
dc.contributor.committeeMemberFeron, Eric
dc.contributor.committeeMemberZhang, Fumin
dc.contributor.committeeMemberReveliotis, Spiridon
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBalcan, Maria-Florina
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWardi, Yorai
dc.date.updated2014-08-27T13:33:18Z


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